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ADAM GARDNER RANKIN*

Geologic Sequestration of CO2: How
EPA’s Proposal Falls Short
ABSTRACT
Carbon capture and geologic storage has been touted as the critical
bridging technology to reduce anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide. The scale of a carbon capture and storage (CCS) program, in
terms of land area and storage time, necessary to achieve significant
emissions reductions demands a unique statutory and regulatory
paradigm to ensure a safe and timely transition from fossil fuels.
Deterrents to sequestration are primarily an uncertain legal framework and unconstrained operator liability, as well as environmental
concerns. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency is proposing
to regulate CCS under a modified rule of the Safe Drinking Water
Act’s Underground Injection Control program. This approach falls
short of the comprehensive scheme necessary. It fails to address longterm environmental and financial liabilities unique to CCS and fails
to take into account how existing laws and regulations may impede
CCS development. This article recommends that CCS be exempted
from key federal environmental statutes and regulations and that a
wholly unique statutory and regulatory framework be developed as
part of a broader effort to curb climate change. Such a framework
would limit the long-term liability of injectors to encourage development while offering greater protections for the public and environment against loss and impairment during the highest-risk phases of
CCS.

I. INTRODUCTION
Mankind’s continued reliance on fossil fuels as a primary energy
source cannot continue unabated without significant, possibly irreversible impacts to climate function and ecological health.1 Average global
* J.D., magna cum laude, with Certificate in Natural Resources Law, University of
New Mexico School of Law 2009; Co-Editor-in-Chief, Natural Resources Journal 2008–09;
B.A., magna cum laude, Amherst College; M.A., Columbia University; M.S., Columbia
University. I would like to thank Prof. Denise Fort for her guidance, encouragement, and
edits; Mark Fesmire for the opportunity to work closely on CCS legal and regulatory issues;
Prof. Reed Benson for his mentorship and edits; and the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law
Foundation for a Joe Rudd Scholarship. I am deeply grateful for the love and support of my
wife, who gives meaning to all that I do.
1. See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, FOURTH ASSESSMENT
REPORT, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS (2007) [hereinafter IPCC
FOURTH SUMMARY]; see also NICHOLAS STERN, STERN REVIEW: THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE
CHANGE, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY i–iii (2006) (noting that “climate change presents very serious
global risks, and it demands an urgent global response” and that “[t]he scientific evidence
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surface temperatures have increased 0.74°C since 1901,2 with most of the
warming having occurred in the last half century.3 Carbon dioxide (CO2)
is likely the primary driver of that warming and, consequently, is considered the most important anthropogenic greenhouse gas; its annual global
emissions, for instance, have increased from 1970 to 2004 by about 80
percent or from 21 gigatons (Gt) to 38 Gt per year.4 As a result, global
concentrations of CO2 have increased from a pre-industrial level of 270
parts per million (ppm) to 379 ppm in 2005—a 40 percent increase—and
now far exceed the natural range of atmospheric concentrations that
have been measured over the last 650,000 years.5
If CO2 is the most important anthropogenic greenhouse gas, coal
is its most important source. Coal represents the largest supply of conventional fossil fuels, exceeding combined reserves of oil and gas,6 and is
widely and evenly distributed around the world among developed and
developing countries.7 Approximately 50 percent of the electricity generated in the United States is derived from coal, accounting for roughly 1.5
billion tons of CO2 emissions each year.8 Coal and coal-based energy is
also relatively cheap,9 and widely used. Many scientists and policymakers believe that the only way to realize significant reductions in CO2
emissions, therefore, is to phase out coal power altogether and/or to cap-

points to increasing risks of serious, irreversible impacts from climate change associated
with business-as-usual (BAU) paths for emissions”).
2. IPCC FOURTH SUMMARY, supra note 1, at Topic 1.1, p.1.
3. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007 (2007) [hereinafter IPCC FOURTH FULL REPORT], at Topic 1.1, p.30 (noting that “[t]he linear warming trend over the 50 years from 1956 to 2005 (0.13 [0.10 to
0.16]°C per decade) is nearly twice that for the 100 years from 1906 to 2005”).
4. IPCC FOURTH SUMMARY, supra note 1, at Topic 2.1, fig.SPM.3, p.5.
5. IPPC FOURTH SUMMARY, supra note 1, at Topic 2.2, p.5.
6. James Hansen et al., Target Atmospheric CO2: Where Should Humanity Aim?, 2 THE
OPEN ATMOSPHERIC SCIENCE J. 217, 226 (2008); see also GRANGER MORGAN ET AL., PEW CENTER
ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, THE U.S. ELECTRIC POWER SECTOR AND CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION iii–iv (2005).
7. M.I.T., THE FUTURE OF COAL: OPTIONS FOR A CARBON CONSTRAINED WORLD 5 (2007)
[hereinafter MIT]; see also MORGAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 3 (noting that coal accounts for
51.2 percent of electric power generated in the United States).
8. MIT, supra note 7, Executive Summary, at ix (2007); see MORGAN ET AL., supra note
6, at 3 (total CO2 emissions from electric power in the United States is about 2.2 Gt per
year).
9. MIT, supra note 7, at 5 (“[Coal] is the lowest-cost fossil source for base-load electricity generation.”).
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ture and geologically sequester CO2 emissions from coal-fired generators
and other stationary sources for permanent subsurface storage.10
While a complete phaseout of coal-fired power plants may be ultimately necessary to fully arrest, if not reverse, increasing carbon emission trends, it will have to be accomplished over time as a new portfolio
of energy sources can be brought online. Given current rates of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, projected energy demand,11 and anticipated climate warming, however, it would be imprudent to wait for
an uncertain transition to alternative energy sources to achieve the emissions reductions necessary to avoid catastrophic or irreversible climate
change. Estimates of CO2 emissions from the electric power sector alone
are projected to increase at least 85 percent from 2.2 Gt a year to about
4.2 Gt a year by 2050, but are more likely to increase 130 percent to 5.2 Gt
a year.12 If this projected trend is to be avoided, something must be done
in the immediate interim to offset emissions resulting from the world’s
ravenous appetite for energy.13
Among the many proposals to reduce greenhouse gas emissions,
carbon capture and storage (CCS) offers a realistic opportunity to go beyond merely offsetting projected increases in carbon emissions to actually reducing current concentrations of atmospheric CO2 by a significant
margin. Unlike most climate mitigation proposals, CCS could actually
reduce current carbon emissions, not just replace carbon energy sources
with non-carbon alternatives. Aside from nuclear power, CCS is also
nearest to being ready for full-scale, commercial deployment. A recent
MIT study announced that “no knowledge gaps today appear to cast
doubt on the fundamental likelihood of the feasibility of CCS.”14 It is also
the only proposed technology that would reduce carbon emissions from
coal, which is projected to be the dominant energy source for the next
half century and the fossil-fuel source that emits the highest concentration of CO2. For these reasons, CCS has been called “the only credible

10. Hansen et al., supra note 6; MORGAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 63 (noting that “substantial reductions in CO2 emissions from the electric power sector will be very difficult to
achieve without significant use of technologies for carbon capture and sequestration”).
11. Electricity demand in 2000 was roughly 2,500 kilowatt-hours (kWh); based on a
linear projection of demand growth, which is what demand has hued to since 1950, electricity demand in 2050 will be about 6,400 kWh, an increase of roughly 160 percent. MORGAN
ET AL., supra note 6, at 57 fig.21.
12. MORGAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 59.
13. See STERN, supra note 1, Executive Summary, at i (“[W]hat we do in the next 10 or
20 years can have a profound effect on the climate in the second half of this century and in
the next.”).
14. MIT, supra note 7, at 44.
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option that would allow the continued use of fossil energy without the
threat of dangerously altering Earth’s climate system.”15
CCS technologies, however, remain unproven on a very large
scale. “The primary obstacles to widespread use of carbon capture and
sequestration are likely to be non-technical,” including unanswered
questions of cost and reliability,16 as well as long-term liability.17 CCS
also poses some unique environmental concerns, including the risk of
CO2 leakage into non-target subsurface strata and the atmosphere.18
Therefore, regulation of CCS requires a robust environmental statutory
and regulatory framework capable of instilling confidence in the public
that the technology is safe and effective, and certainty in the private sector by means of clear performance levels and liability limits. Without a
robust regulatory paradigm that achieves these goals it is unlikely that a
meaningful implementation of CCS will occur.
Carbon capture and storage requires the physical separation of
CO2 from industrial and energy-related emissions sources, transport to a
suitable subsurface storage location, and injection into geologic strata
that have the capacity to safely store large volumes of pressurized carbon.19 Injection involves technologies similar to those currently employed in the oil and gas industry and for the injection and disposal of
oil-field wastes.20 Suitable geologic formations for long-term CO2 storage
include depleted oil and gas fields, unminable coal beds, and deep saline
water formations that have a naturally occurring cap rock or trapping
mechanism sufficient to contain injected CO2.21 While injection of carbon
dioxide has been practiced for years in the context of enhanced oil recov15. Editorial, Capturing Carbon, 442 NATURE 601, 602 (2006), available at http://www.
nature.com/nature/journal/v442/n7103/full/442601b.html.
16. MORGAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 70, 74 (noting that CCS is “likely affordable and
technically feasible”); see also INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SPECIAL REPORT: CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 12 (2005) [hereinafter
IPCC SPECIAL REPORT].
17. See, e.g., Larry Nettles & Mary Conner, Carbon Dioxide Sequestration—Transportation, Storage, and other Infrastructure Issues, 4 TEX. J. OIL, GAS & ENERGY 27, 29–30 (2008–09);
ELIZABETH WILSON ET AL., WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, LIABILITY AND FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FRAMEWORKS FOR CARBON CAPTURE AND SEQUESTRATION 1 (2007).
18. See, e.g., EMILY ROCHON ET AL., GREENPEACE, FALSE HOPE: WHY CARBON CAPTURE
AND STORAGE WON’T SAVE THE CLIMATE 6–7 (2008); IPCC SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 16, at
12.
19. IPCC SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 3; WILSON ET AL., supra note 17.
20. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SPECIAL REPORT: CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE (2005) [hereinafter IPCC SPECIAL REPORT FULL REPORT], ch.1, p.60 (“Injection of CO2 underground would involve similar technology to that employed by the oil and
gas industry[.]”).
21. Id. “Generally, injected CO2 will be less dense than the subsurface waters found in
the site’s geologic formation, and will have a tendency to migrate upwards and laterally
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ery, it has never been employed on the scale contemplated for a successful climate mitigation program. At full scale, unique—but manageable—
environmental issues arise, such as possible leakage into drinking water
sources or saline displacement into fresh groundwater sources, induced
seismicity, and other surface and near-surface impacts that have never
before been addressed by any regulatory paradigm.22
The primary adverse environmental impacts that might arise from
CCS result from the unwanted migration of carbon out of the target geologic reservoir or area of containment.23 While CO2 is not categorized as a
hazardous substance, a sudden, catastrophic release of a large volume of
CO2 into the air through a faulty injection well, an abandoned well, or
some other rapid system failure, could pose a substantial danger to
human life and health if ambient air concentrations exceed 710 percent
CO2 by volume.24 Gradual leaks into the subsurface through undetected
faults, fractures, or perforating wells could kill vegetation and sub-soil
animals and contaminate groundwater.25 “[C]onsiderable uncertainty”
remains regarding the potential damages to local ecosystems from CO2
seepage “but it is known that relatively large releases from natural CO2
reservoirs can inflict measurable damage.”26 Nonetheless, with appropriate site selection, monitoring and a robust regulatory system, the local
health, safety and environmental risks of geological storage of CO2
“would be comparable to the risks of current activities such as natural
gas storage, [enhanced oil recovery] and deep underground disposal of
acid gas.”27 To achieve this level of control over environmental and
safety risks, CCS regulations must be applicable to a broad range of potential environmental impacts and property interests.28 But as the IPCC
noted in its report on CCS, there is a “lack of regulations that are specifically relevant for CO2 storage and [a] lack of clarity relating to post-injection responsibilities.”29

within the formation, making an effective trapping mechanism a key component of minimizing leakage.” WILSON ET AL., supra note 17.
22. See generally WILSON ET AL., supra note 17.
23. See WILSON ET AL., supra note 17, at 3 (recognizing “four distinct areas that may
yield liability including: (1) CO2 leakage to the surface; (2) groundwater contamination; (3)
hydrocarbon damage [impacts to existing mineral rights]; and (4) geological hazards.”
24. IPCC SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 12.
25. Id. at 13.
26. IPCC SPECIAL REPORT FULL REPORT, supra note 20, ch.1, at 63.
27. IPCC SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 12–13.
28. “Injected CO2 is likely to spread over a large subsurface area . . . implicating preexisting mineral rights, water rights, and surface owner claims.” WILSON ET AL., supra note
17, at 2 (citations omitted).
29. IPCC SPECIAL REPORT FULL REPORT, supra note 20, ch.5, at 255.
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Critics of CCS argue that leakage to the atmosphere will limit the
technology’s effectiveness, but unless leakage rates are substantially
greater than 1 percent, leakage will not pose a barrier to achieving significant emissions reductions in the near term.30 As a recent IPCC report on
CCS indicated, appropriately selected and managed geologic reservoirs
will “very likely” retain more than 99 percent of stored CO2 over 100
years, and will “likely” retain more than 99 percent of stored CO2 for the
first 1,000 years.31
Because of inherent uncertainties, such as leakage, CCS must be
employed only as a bridging technology to allow timely transition away
from fossil fuels and not as a permanent solution to enable the indefinite
use of coal and fossil fuels. With all criticisms of CCS fairly considered,
however, it is important to realize that “deep cuts in CO2 emissions from
the electricity sector will be very difficult to achieve over the next 50
years without significant use of technologies for carbon capture and
sequestration.”32
This article is not intended to champion the cause of CCS, so does
not fully weigh its pros and cons. Rather, recognizing the technology’s
viability and the primary impediments to its implementation, this article
sets out to propose a rough framework for developing a workable statu30. The largest sequestration project in the world has been injecting about one million
tons of CO2 per year since 1996 with no leakage yet detected. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, PROSPECTS FOR CO2 CAPTURE AND STORAGE 90 (2004) [hereinafter IEA PROSPECTS] (“So far, results
suggest that there is no leakage and CO2 storage is technically feasible.”). Further, at the
current rate of global CO2 emissions from all sources (about 38 Gt a year) it would take
about 16 years to accumulate that much CO2 in subsurface storage if sequestration were
capturing all CO2 from all emissions sources in the world starting now. That is to say, a 1
percent leakage rate might indeed be a problem 20 years from now if all CO2 emission
sources can be sequestered. A much more likely scenario, however, is that only a small
fraction of CO2 emissions will be captured; emissions will probably only be captured from
large stationary sources, such as industrial plants and electric generation facilities. If all
CO2 emissions from electric generation—approximately nine Gt a year—could be sequestered every year, it would take between 67 and 100 years to inject 600 Gt into the subsurface. By all accounts, that is an overly optimistic estimate. The International Energy Agency
(IEA) projects that if “ambitious CO2 policies are introduced” between five and 19 gigatons
of CO2 can be sequestered by 2050. Id. at 145. Assuming a 1 percent leakage rate for IEA’s
projected pool of stored CO2, the annual global loss of CO2 from the subsurface would
amount to a volume of between 50 megatons and 190 megatons of CO2 per year, which is a
tiny fraction—0.001–0.005—of the current annual global output of 38 Gt. A leakage volume
of between 50–190 megatons would be a drop in the global bucket of carbon emissions,
even if emissions are significantly reduced from the 38 Gt volume by that time.
31. IPCC SPECIAL REPORT FULL REPORT, supra note 20, at 246.
32. MORGAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 70; Howard J. Herzog, What Future for Carbon Capture and Sequestration?, 35(7) ENVT’L SCIENCE & TECH. 148, 153 (Apr. 1, 2001) (“Carbon capture and sequestration are not an alternative to better energy efficiency or increased use of
noncarbon energy sources.”).
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tory and regulatory scheme that is environmentally protective but that
also constrains CCS liability. Given the importance of CCS technologies
in achieving emissions reductions, its potential environmental impacts,
and remaining uncertainties, CCS, if it is to be employed, must be accompanied by a robust legal framework that has the flexibility, capacity, and
authority to address a broad range of impacts and concerns. While some
have argued generally that existing federal and state legal regimes are
adequate for CCS,33 this article contends that the current regulatory regime is insufficient and critiques the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency’s (EPA) approach to addressing CCS.
This article lays out a rough legal framework that serves to encourage CCS development, while offering increased environmental protections relative to EPA’s proposal. The history and background of CCS
is discussed in Part II, which specifically reviews the development of
CCS technologies and current roadblocks to its commercial deployment.
Part III introduces EPA’s proposed regulatory changes to the Underground Injection Control program (UIC) to address CCS; Part III.A provides background on the development and purpose of the UIC; Part III.B
describes EPA’s proposed regulations. Part IV evaluates the shortcomings of EPA’s proposed rule; Part IV.A discusses the applicability of
other environmental laws and regulations to CCS; Part IV.B discusses
financial assurance provisions in EPA’s proposal; Part IV.C reviews
transferability of CCS liability under EPA’s proposal. Part V investigates
general liabilities facing CCS operators; Part V.A introduces methods for
managing CCS liability through analogous liability models; Part V.B proposes legislative methods to limit liability. Part VI details statutory and
regulatory recommendations for a comprehensive carbon management
scheme and Part VII concludes that for climate change mitigation to be
successful in the near term, liabilities facing CCS must be constrained to
encourage its development.
II. CARBON CAPTURE & STORAGE
Significant storage capacity for anthropogenic CO2 has been identified within the crustal voids, unminable coal seams, and saline waters
buried deep within the earth’s sedimentary basins, often more than a
mile underground. Published estimates of the earth’s total geologic capacity for CO2 storage range as high as 200,000 Gt.34 Total U.S. capacity

33. See, e.g., Larry Nettle & Mary Conner, Carbon Dioxide Sequestration—Transportation,
Storage, and Other Infrastructure Issues, 4 TEX. J. OIL, GAS & ENERGY L. 27 (2008–2009).
34. MIT, supra note 7, at 46 fig.4.2.
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has been estimated to be as high as 3,700 Gt.35 To put those figures into
context, total U.S. emissions of CO2 from coal-fired power plants is about
1.5 Gt a year;36 total global emissions of CO2 from coal is about 9 Gt per
year.37 All that capacity for carbon dioxide—enough to hold hundreds,
even thousands or tens of thousands of years of emissions—is going to
be needed if significant near-term cuts in greenhouse gas emissions are
to be realized.
To maintain current atmospheric concentrations of CO2, emissions
must be reduced by 50–85 percent below 2000 levels by 2050.38 Even if
such cuts are achieved, average global air temperatures at the earth’s
surface are still expected to increase 2°C to 2.4°C39 by 2150 as a result of
delayed feedback from already-emitted greenhouse gases.40
As a consequence of this increasingly likely future, scientists, environmental groups, and others have applied increasing pressure to
policymakers and leaders of industrialized nations—the largest emitters
of greenhouse gases—to work together to amend their fossil-fuel ways.
But to achieve meaningful, long-term reductions in emissions requires a
radical shift away from fossil-fuel economies, a move that likely cannot
be accomplished in the short term even though deep emission cuts—as
much as 80 percent below 2000 levels—are required now to avoid possible irreversible ecosystem impacts and limit warming to less than 3°C.41
A shift by developed countries away from fossil fuels is especially important when considering the growing climate impact from developing
countries; they are expected to soon usurp industrialized nations as the
largest emitters of greenhouse gases do not have the resources to implement more costly carbonless energy regimes. With successful implementation in industrialized nations, feasible non-carbon alternatives could be
instituted more easily in developing nations with little disruption to regional or global economies,42 but time and a commitment to transition
are critical to making this happen.
The problem is how to buy the time necessary to implement a
new energy regime without undue economic disruption and without al-

35. Id.; see also Philip M. Marston & Patricia A. Moore, From EOR to CCS: The Evolving
Legal and Regulatory Framework for Carbon Capture and Storage, 29 ENERGY L.J. 421, 438 (2008)
(quoting Dep’t of Energy (DOE) estimates for U.S. storage capacity of between 1,158–3,644
Gt).
36. MIT, supra note 7, Executive Summary, at ix.
37. Id. at 43 (applying a conversion factor of 3.6 to convert tons of C to tons of CO2).
38. IPCC FOURTH FULL REPORT, supra note 3, Topic 5, p.67, tbl.5.1.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See generally MORGAN ET AL., supra note 6.
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lowing ballooning emissions from developing nations to sink the world
in a carbon hole so deep that climate change and its ecological impacts
become irreversible. One answer is CCS. To critics, the concept is anathema,43 as if tucking carbon dioxide into mile-deep saline reservoirs is
akin to sweeping our most odious environmental problems under a rug
without bothering to properly dispose of the mess, because it allows the
current carbon-based regime to motor on without a commitment to
change and detracts from possible advances toward a carbonless energy
regime.44 More and more, however, scientists and policymakers view sequestration as a critical bridge in the transition between energy regimes.
The IPCC concluded in a 2005 report that CCS is likely to be a
highly successful means of preventing anthropogenically produced CO2
from contributing to climate change for long timescales.45 More recently,
a 2007 Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) report concluded
that “CO2 capture and sequestration is the critical enabling technology
that would reduce CO2 emissions significantly. . . .”46 Environmental
groups like the Natural Resources Defense Council now advocate
against approving additional coal-fired power plants without also requiring that they employ CCS technologies.47 And yet CCS projects have
been slow to develop; not one commercial-scale project is in operation

43. See, e.g., ROCHON ET AL., supra note 18, at 7 (“Spending money on CCS is diverting
urgent funding away from renewable energy solutions for the climate crisis.”); Gabrielle
Wong-Parodi et al., Environmental Non-Government Organizations’ Perceptions of Geologic Sequestration, 3 ENVT’L RES. LETTERS 1, 3–4 (2008) (noting that “negatively inclined interviewees described [CCS] as ‘terrible’ or ‘not a good thing,’” and classifying a group of NGOs as
opponents “who view geologic sequestration negatively and that it was unnecessary,” and
further noting that opponents see CCS as a way to prolong fossil-fuel extraction, “continuing an unsustainable energy infrastructure.”); but see id. at 2 (“Little research has been done,
however, to understand what NGOs’ views are of these [CCS] technologies, or if and how
they plan to share them with the public.”).
44. It should be noted that research to date suggests that CCS is generally seen among
U.S. environmental groups as an acceptable mitigation strategy, preferred, for instance,
over increased nuclear energy and even terrestrial sequestration. See Wong-Parodi et al.,
supra note 43, at 7 (“Overall it seems that the majority of US environmental NGOs will
accept CCS with Geologic sequestration as a mitigation solution, while only a small fraction will not.”).
45. IPCC SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 16, at 14 (finding that “[o]bservations from engineered and natural analogues as well as models suggest that the fraction retained in appropriately selected and managed geologic reservoirs is very likely to exceed 99 percent over
100 years and is likely to exceed 99 percent over 1,000 years”).
46. MIT, supra note 7, Executive Summary, at x (emphasis added).
47. DAVID HAWKINS & GEORGE PERIDAS, NO TIME LIKE THE PRESENT: NRDC’S RESPONSE
TO MIT’S ‘FUTURE OF COAL’ REPORT 1 (2007); Herzog, supra note 32, at 148 (noting that in
1998 about 43 megatons of CO2 were injected at 67 commercial enhanced oil recovery
projects in the United States).
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worldwide and only one pilot project is injecting CO2 in volumes of
about one megaton a year.
The paucity of significant projects is not because CCS is technically difficult or outrageously expensive. Techniques employed in carbon sequestration are well understood—more than 50 million tons of
CO2 are successfully injected in the oil patch through 6,100 active injection wells every year in the United States alone through enhanced oil
recovery (EOR) projects.48 Cumulatively, EOR operations have injected
more than 600 million metric tons of CO2 into the subsurface since 1972.49
Approximately 50 percent of that volume cannot be recovered for future
EOR activities and so remains in the subsurface formations.50 Impediments to a large-scale commercial sequestration project are not technical,
rather legal barriers and unconstrained liability function together as the
primary deterrents to commercial development of sequestration.51
Beginning in the early 1990s, scientists and engineers began taking
an interest in CO2 injection as a possible method of climate change mitigation.52 U.S. government investment in CCS started slowly. Prior to
1998, the annual U.S. budget for CCS was between $1 and $2 million, but
by 2001 the budget had increased to $38 million.53 The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 authorized a significant increase in CCS
spending.54 In 2008, Congress authorized $36 million for 15 projects
aimed at furthering development of CCS technologies.55

48. Marston & Moore, supra note 35, at 423 (noting that 50 million metric tons is
“roughly equivalent to the amount of CO2 that might be captured from the first twenty
newly constructed 500 MW coal-fired power plants that capture eighty percent of their CO2
output”); see also HAWKINS & PERIDAS, supra note 47, at 4; MIT, supra note 7, at 43.
49. Marston & Moore, supra note 35, at 423.
50. Id.
51. Nettles & Conner, supra note 17, at 47 (“Commentators tend to agree that the longterm liability following the injection and closure phases of a sequestration project presents
unique legal issues, in part because of the large scale of the project (carbon sequestration
sites will be larger than natural gas storage or EOR), and in part because of the long period
of time.”).
52. Herzog, supra note 32, at 148.
53. Id. at 150.
54. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, H.R. 6, 110th Cong. §§ 703, 711
(providing $200 million per year for fiscal years 2009 through 2013 for CCS demonstration
projects and $30 million a year for years 2008 through 2012 for geologic capacity research);
see generally PETER FOLGER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS, CARBON CAPTURE AND SEQUESTRATION (CCS) (updated Feb. 7, 2008), available at http://opencrs.
com/document/RL33801/2008-02-07/.
55. U.S. DOE, Press Release, DOE to Provide $36 Million to Advance Carbon Dioxide
Capture, U.S. Dep’t of Energy (July 31, 2008), http://fossil.energy.gov/news/techlines/
2008/08030-CO2_capture_Projects_Selected.html.
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Spending on CCS has ramped up as it has become more apparent
that a solution to atmospheric warming may lie underground. Estimates
from the U.S. Department of Energy and the International Energy
Agency (IEA) suggest that the United States may have storage capacity
for “a thousand years of CO2 emissions from nearly 1,000 coal-fired
power plants.”56
EPA’s analysis of recent legislative proposals relating to climate
change “indicate[s] that CCS has the potential to play a significant role in
climate change mitigation scenarios.”57 For example, EPA estimates that
CCS could account for 30 percent of CO2 emissions reductions in 2050
under the Lieberman-Warner bill, S. 2191.58
For CCS to be an effective mitigation option, however, it must be
deployed on a grand scale. Under a rough assumption of CO2 density at
depth, the IEA has estimated that a 500-megawatt power plant storing
three megatons of CO2 per year would require six square kilometers of
aquifer storage per year.59 Over the plant’s lifespan of about 40 years,
required storage would occupy about 240-square kilometers or roughly
93-square miles.60 Storage of 16 Gt of CO2 per year—about 1.8 times the
current volume of global CO2 emissions from coal—could require an
area of about 40,000-square kilometers or about 1,550-square miles, a
massive area.61 Beyond the enormous storage areas required to achieve
CCS climate mitigation goals, other projections of what full commercial
deployment of CCS would look like suggest the immense scale of such
an undertaking. If all the CO2 emitted from U.S. coal-burning plants
were captured, the quantity of that gas would be “equivalent to three
times the weight and . . . one-third of the annual volume of natural gas
transported by the U.S. gas pipeline system.”62 If only 60 percent of this
CO2 were “compressed to a liquid for geologic sequestration, its volume
would about equal the total U.S. oil consumption of 20 million barrels
per day.”63 These figures are of particular significance because while the
earth’s subsurface has a significant storage capacity, storage sites “are

56. Federal Requirements Under the Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program
for Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Geologic Sequestration (GS) Wells, 73 Fed. Reg. 43,492, 43,496
(proposed July 25, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 144 & 146).
57. Id.
58. Id. (citing U.S. EPA, Climate Change—Climate Economics, http://www.epa.gov/
climatechange/economics/economicanalyses.html.)
59. IEA PROSPECTS, supra note 30, at 92 (assuming a CO2 storage depth of about three
meters at a density of 0.5 tons of CO2 per cubic meter).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. MIT, supra note 7, Executive Summary, at ix.
63. Id.
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not spread evenly across and within all regions,” meaning that either a
significant transportation infrastructure must be developed to move CO2
to injection zones, or power plants and industrial facilities that emit CO2
will have to be relocated over time to regions where CCS is viable.64
Despite these challenges, interest in CCS has accelerated in recent
years in response to the technology’s increasing feasibility.65 Nonetheless, no commercial projects have been initiated to date and only a few
research-scale pilot projects have been undertaken worldwide. A significant reason for this slow development is the lack of a clear legal and
regulatory framework.66 Many current projects are regulated on a caseby-case basis, creating uncertainty and confusion about property rights
and long-term environmental and financial liability. This uncertainty is
especially problematic during the post-injection phase of projects,67
which can endure for hundreds, even thousands of years until the injected CO2 has stabilized. Commentators have argued that it is necessary
to create a legal framework that resolves these legal uncertainties for
CCS to be advanced on a scale that would be required to effectively reduce carbon emissions.68 To date, however, no federal statutes or regulations address the unique nature of CCS, though several states have
flirted with creating a comprehensive regulatory framework.69 Further,
64. IEA PROSPECTS, supra note 30, at 92.
65. See NATIONAL ENERGY TECHNOLOGY LABORATORY, INTERNATIONAL CARBON CAPTURE
AND STORAGE PROJECTS: OVERCOMING LEGAL BARRIERS 5 (2006) [hereinafter NETL LEGAL
BARRIERS].
66. See INTERSTATE OIL AND GAS COMPACT COMMISSION, CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE: A REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR STATES, SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 5 (2005); NEW
MEXICO ENERGY, MINERALS, AND NATURAL RESOURCES DEP’T, OIL CONSERVATION DIV., CARBON DIOXIDE SEQUESTRATION: REPORT ON IDENTIFIED STATUTORY AND REGULATORY ISSUES: A
BLUEPRINT FOR THE REGULATION OF GEOLOGIC SEQUESTRATION OF CARBON DIOXIDE IN NEW
MEXICO (2007) [hereinafter NEW MEXICO CCS]; DEP’T OF ENERGY, NAT’L ENERGY TECH. LAB.,
INTERNATIONAL CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE PROJECTS OVERCOMING LEGAL BARRIERS 1
(2006); ROCHON ET AL., supra note 18, at 7.
67. See NETL LEGAL BARRIERS, supra note 65, at 5–6.
68. See, e.g., id.
69. In 2008, 31 states were considering legislation addressing CCS. COURTNEY WELCH,
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, MEMORANDUM ON CARBON CAPTURE AND
SEQUESTRATION LEGISLATION 1 (2008). For example, Wyoming passed a law to clarify ownership of subsurface pore space in anticipation of CCS. See WYO. STAT.1977 § 34-1-152 (2008)
(declaring ownership of subsurface pore space belongs to the surface owner). Other states
have proposed legislation that has not passed, or have conducted extensive studies of what
is required to implement CCS. See NEW MEXICO CCS, supra note 66; ELIZABETH A. BURTON
ET AL., CALIFORNIA ENERGY COMMISSION, NO. CEC-500-2007-100-CMF, GEOLOGIC CARBON
SEQUESTRATION STRATEGIES FOR CALIFORNIA: REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE (2008), www.energy.ca.gov/2007publications/CEC-500-2007-100/CEC-500-2007-100-CMF.PDF. No state
has addressed long-term liability and no state action can ameliorate the questions regarding federal environment liabilities.
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industry representatives argue that under current law, CCS projects
“may face excessive liability” and regulatory control, creating “[l]egal uncertainty, undue restrictions and liability [that] could discourage the development and deployment” of CCS.70
In partial response to these legal shortcomings and to address
gaps in regulations as the number of pilot projects increase, EPA has
issued a proposed UIC rule specific to CCS.71 But while EPA acknowledges that the unique factors inherent to CCS require specific and unique
regulations, the proposal focuses on only the injection phase, site closure,
and protection of drinking water sources. In doing so, the proposal falls
far short of a comprehensive statutory and regulatory paradigm that is
necessary to provide the adequate guidance carbon injectors need. EPA
acknowledges that “regulatory certainty” is needed to foster industry
adoption of CCS,72 but the proposed rule provides only a sliver of the
certainty required. As commentators have emphasized, “a clumsy regulatory approach could seriously impede or even eliminate further development of this promising mitigation option.”73 To avoid such an
outcome, the federal government should develop a comprehensive and
integrated approach to addressing climate change. Regulation of CCS
would be but a part of such a scheme.
III. EPA’S PROPOSED REGULATORY CHANGES TO UIC
Recognizing “the unique nature of CO2 injection for [geological
sequestration],” EPA proposed in July 2008 to create a new category of
injection wells under the existing Underground Injection Control (UIC)
Program of the Safe Drinking Water Act “to allow for permitting of the
injection of CO2 for the purpose of [geologic sequestration].”74 The proposed rule applies to “owners and operators of wells that will be used to
inject CO2 into the subsurface for the purpose of long-term storage.”75 It
essentially proposes the creation of a new class of injection well—Class
VI—under the UIC program with minimum technical criteria for the
characterization of the injection-site geology, fluid movement, area of re70. Jeffrey W. Moore, The Potential Law of On-Shore Geologic Sequestration of CO2 Captured From Coal-Fired Power Plants, 28 ENERGY L.J. 443, 443, 447 (2007).
71. Federal Requirements Under the Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program
for Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Geologic Sequestration (GS) Wells, 73 Fed. Reg. 43,495 (proposed
July 25, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 144 & 146).
72. Id. at 43,496.
73. MORGAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 70.
74. Federal Requirements Under the Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program
for Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Geologic Sequestration (GS) Wells, 73 Fed. Reg. 43,492, 43,495
(proposed July 25, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 144 & 146).
75. Id. at 43,492.
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view and corrective action, well construction, operations, integrity testing, monitoring, well plugging, post-injection site care, and site closure,
all with the “purpose[ ] of protecting underground sources of drinking
water [ ].”76 As EPA makes clear, the proposed regulations rely heavily
on the preexisting regulatory framework of the UIC, but is tailored “so
that they are appropriate for the unique nature of injecting large volumes
of CO2 into a variety of geological formations,” and again, with the principal goal being the protection of underground sources of drinking
water.77 The proposed rule’s chief benefit is that it will promote consistency in permitting CCS projects across the United States and consistency in reviewing criteria for each proposed injection project.78 Given
the limitations inherent in the authority granted by the Safe Drinking
Water Act, however, EPA’s proposed rule under the UIC does not address the most critical gaps responsible for the bulk of the uncertainty
currently impeding CCS development: Subsurface property rights and a
long-term liability scheme.79
A. UIC Background
The Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA)80 was enacted in 1974 and
directed EPA to set and maintain health-based standards for contaminants in drinking water sources.81 The UIC regulatory program82 was implemented under the authority of Part C of the SDWA in 1980.83 The
program now manages more than 800,000 injection wells nationwide.84
Primacy for state implementation of the program has been delegated to
34 states.85 The UIC regulations were “designed to prevent fluid movement into [underground sources of drinking water] by addressing the

76. Id.
77. Id. at 43,495.
78. Id.
79. EPA expressly acknowledges this shortcoming of the proposed rule. See Federal
Requirements Under the Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program for Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Geologic Sequestration (GS) Wells, 73 Fed. Reg. 43,495 (proposed July 25, 2008)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 144 & 146).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 300(f)–(j) (2000).
81. See 42 U.S.C. § 300(g-1) (2000).
82. 40 C.F.R. §§ 144–49 (2008).
83. U.S. EPA, History of the UIC Program—Injection Well Time Line, http://www.
epa.gov/safewater/uic/history.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2009).
84. Federal Requirements Under the Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program
for Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Geologic Sequestration (GS) Wells, 73 Fed. Reg. 43,498 (proposed
July 25, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 144 & 146).
85. See U.S. EPA, UIC Program Primacy, http://www.epa.gov/safewater/uic/primacy.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2009).
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potential pathways through which injected fluids can migrate into [underground sources of drinking water].”86
To accomplish its goals, the UIC classifies injection wells into five
classes or well types each with similar functions, construction and operating features so the minimum technical requirements can be applied
consistently across each well category.87 Class I wells inject hazardous
and non-hazardous fluids, both industrial and municipal wastes, into
isolated formations beneath the lowermost underground source of
drinking water. Because Class I wells include injection of hazardous
wastes, they are the most strictly regulated under the UIC program and
are further regulated under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA).88 For example, operators of Class I wells must demonstrate that
hazardous fluids injected into the substrata will not migrate from the
identified injection zone for as long as the fluids remain hazardous.89
Furthermore, Class I well operators must continuously monitor the injection well, the fluid within the well, and any possible migration out of the
target injection zone.
Each of the broad regulatory components of the UIC—siting, area
of review and corrective action, well construction, operation, mechanical
integrity testing of the well during operation, injection monitoring, wellplugging and post-injection site care, and closure—is principally aimed
at protecting groundwater sources. Siting requirements, for example, ensure that wells inject fluids into geologic strata or zones that are capable
of storing the particular fluid and that the target zone is below a confining strata that is free of known faults or fractures that could allow upward migration of the injected fluid, potentially endangering
underground sources of drinking water.90 The UIC also requires an indepth examination of the vertical and horizontal extent of the area that
will be influenced by the injection and the identification of all artificial
penetrations, such as wells, that may act as conduits for fluid movement
into underground sources of drinking water. For perforations that need

86. Federal Requirements Under the Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program
for Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Geologic Sequestration (GS) Wells, 73 Fed. Reg. 43,498 (proposed
July 25, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 144 & 146).
87. See 40 C.F.R. § 144.6 (2008); U.S. EPA, Classes of Wells, http://www.epa.gov/safe
water/uic/wells.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2009).
88. See 40 C.F.R. § 144.14 (2008) (requirements for wells injecting hazardous waste);
U.S. EPA, Industrial & Municipal Waste Disposal Wells (Class I), http://www.epa.gov/
safewater/uic/wells_class1.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2009).
89. 40 C.F.R. § 144.12 (2008).
90. Federal Requirements Under the Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program
for Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Geologic Sequestration (GS) Wells, 73 Fed. Reg. 43,498–99 (proposed July 25, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 144 & 146).
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repairing, the UIC requires the injector to perform corrective action to
ensure they are properly sealed.91 In addition to having to periodically
demonstrate the mechanical integrity of injection wells, injectors must
also monitor the injected fluid to verify its location and to demonstrate
that injected fluids are confined to intended geologic storage zones.92
Upon completion of injection, the UIC requires that injection wells be
adequately plugged to prevent their serving as conduits for future migration of injected fluids and that the fluids in the injection zone do not
endanger underground sources of drinking water.93
B. EPA’s Preferred Alternative94
Under EPA’s proposal, the basic components of the UIC regulatory scheme remain intact, but are tailored through a new class of injection wells—Class VI—that addresses unique factors inherent in CCS,
such as the large volumes of CO2, long-term storage, the buoyant and
viscous nature of CO2 as a supercritical fluid, and its corrosiveness in
water.95 In general, the proposed rules are similar to existing UIC requirements, but are more restrictive.96 In considering these factors, EPA
proposes to modify UIC requirements for site characterization, area of
review, well construction, mechanical integrity testing, monitoring, well
plugging, site closure, and post-injection site care.97
The geologic siting requirements for the proposed Class VI wells
are more substantial than current UIC requirements and target factors
that are specifically relevant to CO2 injection. They include “[a] detailed
geologic assessment” identifying the contours and extent of nearby underground sources of drinking water and a demonstration “that the injection zone is sufficiently porous to receive CO2 without fracturing and
extensive enough to receive the anticipated total volumes of injected

91. Id. at 43,499.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. The purpose of this section is to provide the reader with a brief, contextual
overview of EPA’s proposed rule. The intent is not to provide a comprehensive evaluation
or analysis of the proposal, but merely to demonstrate that none of its provisions address
the most significant hurdles to implementing CCS. To review specific requirements under
the proposed rule see id. at 43,534–41.
95. Federal Requirements Under the Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program
for Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Geologic Sequestration (GS) Wells, 73 Fed. Reg. 43,504 (proposed
July 25, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 144 & 146).
96. Marston & Moore, supra note 35, at 468.
97. Federal Requirements Under the Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program
for Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Geologic Sequestration (GS) Wells, 73 Fed. Reg. 43,504 (proposed
July 25, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 144 & 146).
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CO2.”98 The siting requirements also specify that there must be a confining strata to limit upward migration of the entire plume of injected CO2,
as well as a full characterization of other geologic features, including the
presence of any fractures and faults, geo-mechanical studies of fault stability and rock stress, ductility, and strength, as well as the target zone’s
porosity.99
The area-of-review requirements under current UIC regulations
are based on either a fixed radius (one-quarter mile surrounding a well
or wells, for a permit area covering multiple wells for Class I, II, or III
wells, or two miles around a well or permit area for Class I hazardous
waste injection wells) or a simple mathematical computation.100 To account for CO2’s “complex multi-phase buoyant flow” (i.e., CO2 flows and
behaves differently depending on whether it is a supercritical fluid, a
gas, or some combination of the two) and “compounds that may be mobilized due to injection,” EPA proposes that injectors use computational
fluid-flow models designed for each specific injection site.101 Similar to
existing requirements in the UIC, EPA proposes that injectors must identify all artificial penetrations in the area of influence and determine if any
require corrective action to address deficiencies, regardless of ownership,
if they could serve as potential conduits to other strata, particularly those
holding underground sources of drinking water.102 Corrective action contemplated in the proposal includes using corrosion-resistant cements in
deficient wells within the area of influence.103 Because of the long
timeframe contemplated for CCS projects, the proposed rule requires periodic reevaluation, “at a minimum fixed frequency, not to exceed 10
years,” of the area of influence during the injection phase of the project.104
The proposed rule also contemplates a phased approach to the corrective
action requirements, if appropriate, to allow injectors to address issues
over time as the CO2 plume grows in size, rather than preemptively and
all at once.105
Well construction requirements under EPA’s proposed rule also
include unique features designed to address CCS. The most significant
proposed requirement for well construction is that the well’s surface cas98. Id. at 43,505, 43,536.
99. Id. at 43,505, 43,436–38.
100. Id. at 43,506.
101. Id.
102. Federal Requirements Under the Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program
for Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Geologic Sequestration (GS) Wells, 73 Fed. Reg. 43,507 (proposed
July 25, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 144 & 146).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 43,507–08.
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ing “be set through the base of the lowermost [underground source of
drinking water] and cemented to the surface,” and that the long-string
casing be cemented along its entire length106 to protect drinking water
sources and to prevent migration of injectate out of the target zone.
Proposed well operation rules are similar to those in place for existing Class I deep-well requirements so that injectors must limit CO2
injection pressures to avoid new fractures in the injection zone or the
propagation of existing fractures, except for some limited circumstances.107 EPA proposes that injection pressures not exceed 90 percent of
the fracture pressure measured for the injection zone.108 The injector
must also submit a testing and monitoring plan for the period of operation at the time of the permit application. Such monitoring must include
analysis of the injected carbon dioxide stream (physical and chemical
characteristics); continuing recording devices to monitor injection pressures, rates, and volumes; corrosion monitoring of the well materials;
periodic monitoring of groundwater quality and geochemical changes
above the confining zones; placement of monitoring wells; monitoring of
the extent of the carbon dioxide plume and its pressure front; and surface air and/or soil monitoring for carbon dioxide that could endanger
an underground source of drinking water, at EPA director’s discretion.109
Critical to understanding the subsurface impact of CCS is the ability to track and monitor the CO2 plume. To that end, EPA’s tracking and
monitoring requirements for CCS exceed the scope of any of the UIC’s
current rules. Monitoring, using direct geochemical and indirect geophysical techniques, provides updated inputs for continuing modeling
and helps identify needed corrective actions.110 It also provides an adequacy check on the area of review111 and allows it to be scaled back or
expanded over time depending on the monitoring results.
Also similar to current requirements for Class I hazardous waste
injection wells, EPA’s proposal “specifies a requirement that . . . injection should be allowed only beneath the lowermost formation containing a[n] [underground source of drinking water],”112 although EPA is

106. Id. at 43,509.
107. See Federal Requirements Under the Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program for Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Geologic Sequestration (GS) Wells, 73 Fed. Reg. 43,510
(proposed July 25, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 144 & 146).
108. Id. at 43,510.
109. Id. at 43,539–40.
110. Id. at 43,514–15.
111. See id. at 43,516.
112. Federal Requirements Under the Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program
for Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Geologic Sequestration (GS) Wells, 73 Fed. Reg. 43,511 (proposed
July 25, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 144 & 146).
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seeking comment on allowing injection above or between strata containing underground sources of drinking water.113
EPA explains that “[p]lacing distance between the point of injection and [underground sources of drinking water] allows for the necessary confining and buffer formations, and further provides for
opportunity for additional monitoring to detect any excursions from the
intended injection zone.”114
Also exceeding the current UIC regulatory requirements is EPA’s
proposal for post-injection site care and site closure, which are “more
substantial than that required for other classes of injection wells.”115 First,
EPA is proposing that permit applicants “submit a demonstration of financial responsibility to plug the well, to provide for post-injection care,
and site closure.”116 The proposal would further require that injectors
provide EPA at least 60 days notice “of their intent to plug an injection
well and of any updates to the post-injection site care and site closure
plan.”117 After plugging, the owners or injectors must submit a report
certifying that the well was plugged in accordance with the approved
plans, at which point the site would enter a post-injection monitoring
period of 50 years following the cessation of injection and may continue
at EPA’s discretion “until the geologic sequestration project no longer
poses an endangerment to [underground sources of drinking water].”118
Upon demonstrating to EPA’s satisfaction that the CCS project no longer
poses a threat to drinking water sources, EPA may reduce the monitoring frequency or may authorize site closure before the end of the 50-year
period.119 The proposed rule does not specify what data is required, or
what techniques should be employed to make this demonstration, but
instead assumes that operators will use one or more of a variety of tests

113. Id. at 43,512.
114. Id. at 43,511.
115. Id. at 43,517 (discussing some of the additional requirements related to Class VI
wells); id. at 43,502 (noting that the proposed Class VI wells have the same basic requirements as Class I hazardous waste wells, which “are managed with technically sophisticated
construction and operation requirements,” but with additional and on-going permitting
requirements relating to area of review and site characterization, operating, monitoring,
well plugging, and post-injection site care and site closure requirements).
116. Id. at 43,517.
117. Federal Requirements Under the Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program
for Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Geologic Sequestration (GS) Wells, 73 Fed. Reg. 43,517 (proposed
July 25, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 144 & 146).
118. Id. at 43,540–41 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 146.93). UIC’s current regulations
don’t limit the duration of post-injection site care and monitoring, but “many environmental programs use a 30-year period as a frame of reference,” which has generally “been sufficient.” Id. at 43,519.
119. Id. at 43,541 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 146.93(b)(2)).
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available.120 EPA’s approach to post-injection monitoring and site closure
represents what is essentially a hybrid regulatory approach by “proposing . . . a combination of a fixed timeframe and performance standard
be used to determine the duration of the post-injection site care period.”121 EPA selected this approach because research indicates the stabilization time will vary depending on the particular geochemical and
geological conditions of the site, but that stabilization should occur
within 10–100 years after cessation of injection.122 The 50-year default is
being proposed as a “mid-point” to ensure that the timeframe “is long
enough to determine that there is no threat of endangerment to [underground sources of drinking water],” but the proposal also gives EPA discretion to shorten or lengthen the monitoring period “for 100 years (or
longer),” if necessary.123
The EPA director can end the post-site closure monitoring period
after all information has been received regarding the post-injection site
care and closure plan if the director is satisfied that there is no threat to
underground sources of drinking water.124 After closure approval, the
owner/operator of the site has 90 days to submit a site closure report
documenting injection monitoring and well plugging; copies of notifications to state and local authorities with authority over drilling in the region and records reflecting the nature, composition, and volume of the
injected CO2.125 The owner/operator is also responsible for recording a
“notation on the deed to the facility property or any other document that
is normally examined during title search that will, in perpetuity, provide

120. Id. at 43,518, 43,539 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 146.90(g) (describing types of
carbon dioxide monitoring techniques that would suffice, e.g., seismic, electrical, gravity, or
electromagnetic surveys and/or down-hole carbon dioxide detection tools).
121. Federal Requirements Under the Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program
for Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Geologic Sequestration (GS) Wells, 73 Fed. Reg. 43,518 (proposed
July 25, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 144 & 146).
122. Id. at 43,519, 43,520 (expressing EPA’s confidence that most CO2 sequestration sites
will stabilize within 100 years).
123. Id. at 43,519–20. Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission (IOGCC) proposes a
10-year closure period during which the operator maintains responsibility prior to transfer
to the public sector. INTERSTATE OIL AND GAS COMPACT COMMISSION, CO2 STORAGE: A LEGAL
AND REGULATORY GUIDE FOR STATES 4 (2007) [hereinafter IOGCC 2007]. The European
Union proposes a minimum 20-year, post-closure period during which the operator maintains responsibility prior to transfer to the public sector. Directive of the European Parliament
and Council, No. 2009/31/EC, 2009 O.J. (L. 140), art. 18 (Apr. 23, 2009), available at http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/file.jsp?id=5588432.
124. Federal Requirements Under the Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program
for Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Geologic Sequestration (GS) Wells, 73 Fed. Reg. 43,520 (proposed
July 25, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 144 & 146).
125. Id.
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notification to any potential purchaser of the property information that
the land has been used to sequester CO2.”126
Finally, EPA also proposes imposing a financial responsibility requirement adequate to cover “activities related to closing and remediating” sequestration sites.127 The proposal does not define what level of
financial security is adequate. Instead, “EPA is proposing that the rule
only specify a general duty to obtain financial responsibility acceptable
to the [EPA] Director, and will provide guidance to be developed at a
later date that describes recommended types of financial mechanisms
that owners or operators can use to meet this requirement.”128 Responsibility, however, cannot “extend to . . . activities unrelated to protection
of [underground sources of drinking water] (e.g., coverage of risks to air,
ecosystems, or public health unrelated to [underground sources of drinking water] endangerment).”129 The proposed rule, because of a lack of
statutory authority under the SDWA, also “does not cover transfer of
owner or operator financial liability to other entities, or creation of a
third party financial mechanism where EPA is the trustee.”130
The proposal, however, does clearly prescribe which liabilities are
included within this financial responsibility scheme. Because of the
SDWA’s limited authority, these liabilities are quite narrow. Financial
liability expressly extends to “corrective action,” “injection well plugging,” “post-injection site care and site closure,” and “emergency and remedial response.” Each of these regulatory components has
requirements for sufficiency that are prescribed by the proposed rule.131
The EPA director would have discretion to determine if the financial
mechanism proposed by the operator is sufficient.132 As the project progresses, the owner-operator must submit periodic updates on the cost
estimate for its financial responsibility.133

126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. EPA may be requiring only a “general duty” because the Safe Drinking Water
Act (SDWA) provides no explicit authority to impose financial responsibility on injectors.
See Federal Requirements Under the Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program for
Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Geologic Sequestration (GS) Wells, 73 Fed. Reg. 43,520 (proposed
July 25, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 144 & 146).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 43,520, 43,522.
131. Id. at 43,537; see also id. at 43,540–41 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 146.84, pt. 146.92,
pt. 146.93, pt. 146.94, respectively).
132. Federal Requirements Under the Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program
for Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Geologic Sequestration (GS) Wells, 73 Fed. Reg. 43,520, 43,537
(proposed July 25, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 144 & 146).
133. Id. at 43,520–21, 43,537 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 146.85(b)).
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Formal financial responsibility under the UIC terminates after the
post-injection monitoring period has ended,134 at which point the operator would be free to discontinue paying for whatever financial-assurance
mechanism was in place. But, as EPA’s comments in the Federal Register
make clear, “owners or operators may still be held responsible after the
post-injection site care period has ended . . . [because] [t]rust responsibility for potential impacts to [underground sources of drinking water]
remain with the owner or operator indefinitely under current [Safe Drinking Water Act] provisions.”135 The perpetual liability under the SDWA
and the UIC is a significant problem with the current EPA proposal, and
will likely serve as an impediment to full commercial-scale implementation of CCS, as EPA itself recognizes. Indefinite liability imposes significant financial risks to owner/operators for ongoing costs that may arise,
so “stakeholders have expressed interest in alternative instruments for
addressing financial responsibility after the post injection care period has
ended.”136 Despite this expressed interest and concern, the extent of
EPA’s discussion on “Considerations for Long-term Care” comprises less
than one column in the federal register.137
Given the number of unknowns in the developing field of CCS,
EPA has taken an “adaptive approach” to implementing CCS regulations,138 culminating with a final rule that is expected to be issued in
2011.139 Under this approach, EPA hopes to allow development of early
CCS projects, including experimental projects that can be permitted as
Class V wells through guidance documents,140 while still providing a
mechanism in the rulemaking process to collect and incorporate new
data as it becomes available.141 EPA will then “continue to evaluate ongoing research and demonstration projects, review input received . . . and
gather other relevant information . . . to make refinements to the

134. Id.
135. Id. at 43,522 (emphasis added).
136. Id. at 43,522.
137. Federal Requirements Under the Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program
for Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Geologic Sequestration (GS) Wells, 73 Fed. Reg. 43,522 (proposed
July 25, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 144 & 146).
138. Id.
139. U.S. EPA, Proposed UIC Regulations for Geologic Sequestration of Carbon Dioxide
7 (Feb. 26–27, 2008) (workshop minutes).
140. See U.S. EPA, Using the Class V Experimental Technology Well Classification for
Pilot Geologic Sequestration Projects—UIC Program Guidance (UICPG #83) (Mar. 1, 2007).
141. Federal Requirements Under the Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program
for Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Geologic Sequestration (GS) Wells, 73 Fed. Reg. 43,522 (proposed
July 25, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 144 & 146).
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rulemaking process,” but will “issue a final rule in advance of full-scale
deployment.”142
IV. SHORTCOMINGS OF EPA’S PROPOSED RULE
EPA’s proposed regulations are, in many ways, necessary for the
proper and orderly implementation of CCS. The suggested regulatory
vehicle, however, is ultimately inappropriate and affords insufficient
statutory authority to adequately regulate CO2 sequestration and its full
complement of associated environmental risks. CCS appears on its surface to be similar to other injection programs already regulated under the
UIC, so its regulation would seem to fit within the same framework.
However, it is inappropriate to attempt to cram carbon mitigation into a
box that was built solely to protect underground sources of drinking
water when many more environmental impacts are in fact implicated by
CCS.
Carbon is unlike any other regulated emissions source and should
be regulated unlike any other emissions source—its behavior, importance, and impacts in the natural system do not fit easily within the definition of a pollutant because animals respire it, plants depend on it for
energy production, and large volumes naturally circulate within the geosphere and biosphere. Carbon is unique in its chemical and environmental impacts and benefits, the role it plays in man’s industry and
economy, and also within the natural ecosystem. Therefore, carbon mitigation (e.g., CCS) ought to be contemplated within a much broader statutory and regulatory framework designed specifically for carbon.
Because neither the SDWA nor the UIC contemplated CCS, EPA’s proposed framework is ill-suited to address the unique liability issues associated with the anticipated scale—both in terms of time and areal
extent—of this climate-change mitigation strategy. As a consequence, the
proposed rule does little to encourage this critical carbon mitigation
strategy and much to discourage it. The combined effect of a maladapted
regulatory framework and industry disincentives could lower public
confidence in CCS because environmental protections are lacking and
the proposed liability framework does not generate certainty.
EPA’s proposed regulations are, however, well-suited to certain
aspects of the siting, drilling, injection, closure, and even post-closure
phases of CCS. So much about these phases of CCS relate to the technical
aspects of injection, which the UIC is particularly good at addressing:
understanding the characteristics of the injection-site geology and the
target formation, the surrounding formations and the nature and extent
142. Id.
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of nearby underground sources of drinking water, as well as ensuring
that the most protective well drilling technologies are employed. Further, impairment of underground sources of drinking water is certainly
one of the primary risks posed by CCS, particularly in the western
United States, where domestic and municipal users rely heavily on
groundwater as a drinking water source. From the sole purpose of the
UIC, the proposed rule does manage to achieve a modicum of protection
beyond the scope of the SDWA, albeit indirectly and without firm authority for enforcement. For example, in the preamble to the proposed
rule, EPA emphasizes that “[w]hile preventing releases of CO2 to the atmosphere is not within the scope of this proposal, today’s proposed
rulemaking also addresses the risks posed by releases to the atmosphere
by ensuring that injected CO2 remains in the confining formations.”143
But while this may be so and EPA’s proposed rule “may also prevent
migration of CO2 to the surface,”144 the rule does not provide enforcement authority for impacts to air, ecosystems or public health.145 As a
consequence, any protections afforded against other risks posed by CCS
come merely as a side effect to protection of underground sources of
drinking water. Without the power of enforcement, such secondary protections offer hollow comfort.
The SDWA, as the authorizing statute for the UIC and its regulations, does not provide adequate authority to address all, or even most,
of the potential environmental issues that should be contemplated and
managed in a comprehensive CCS regulatory framework. The SDWA
limits regulatory authority over injection wells to the protection of underground sources of drinking water; the Act does not authorize regulation of injection wells for any other purpose. As a consequence, the
proposed regulations are focused on the protection of underground
sources of drinking water to the exclusion of all other environmental
considerations, such as impacts to human health and other natural resources. The proposed regulations create uncertain and open-ended liability for numerous potential environmental impacts by implicating
other environmental statutes—in particular the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act—and by barring the
transfer of liability to the public sector or even another private entity that

143. Federal Requirements Under the Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program
for Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Geologic Sequestration (GS) Wells, 73 Fed. Reg. 43,498 (proposed
July 25, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 144 & 146).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 43,522. The SDWA also fails to provide authority to regulate carbon capture
and transport, determination of property rights, transfer of liability, accounting and certification for greenhouse gas reductions. Id. at 43,495.

\\server05\productn\N\NMN\49-3-4\NMN3405.txt

Summer-Fall 2009]

unknown

Seq: 25

GEOLOGIC SEQUESTRATION OF CO2

8-JUN-10

15:39

907

might be better positioned to adopt and manage a site’s long-term
liability.
A. Implications of CERCLA and RCRA Applicability
EPA gives little guidance regarding the applicability to CCS of
one of the nation’s most important environmental statutes—the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA)146—when, more than anything, certainty is required for public confidence and operator incentive. Conversely, EPA’s approach regarding another major federal environmental statute—the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)147—provides a clearer path for
operators and injectors to limit their liability under this statute.
If the CO2 stream captured from coal combustion were pure, no
question of RCRA or CERCLA applicability would arise because CO2 itself is not considered a hazardous pollutant under either statute. Yet an
injected carbon stream for CCS will likely never be pure CO2, and will
contain low concentrations of impurities from the source coal148 that will
vary “depending on the fuel source, the capture process” and other factors.149 In general, impurities could create more acidic subsurface conditions (e.g., sulfur dioxide) that are themselves toxic by “accelerating the
formation of fluid-conducting pathways . . . and the dissolution of geologic materials in the subsurface.”150
The question, then, is whether any of the impurities, either by
themselves or as a consequence of their mobilization of native subsurface
contaminants cause the injected CO2 to be subject to either RCRA or
CERCLA. EPA’s strategy regarding RCRA applicability is to essentially
exempt CO2 from RCRA by defining “carbon dioxide stream” to exclude
hazardous wastes.151 The proposed rule “assures that it would apply only
to CO2 streams that are not hazardous wastes” as defined by RCRA regulations.152 Therefore, “operators will need to characterize their CO2
146. 42 U.S.C. § 9601–28 (2000).
147. 42 U.S.C. § 6901–54 (2000).
148. Federal Requirements Under the Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program
for Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Geologic Sequestration (GS) Wells, 73 Fed. Reg. 43,503 (proposed
July 25, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 144 & 146); U.S. EPA, TECHNICAL SUPPORT
DOC., VULNERABILITY EVALUATION FRAMEWORK FOR GEOLOGIC SEQUESTRATION OF CARBON DIOXIDE 22 (2008).
149. EPA, TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOC, supra note 148, at 22.
150. Id. at 23.
151. Federal Requirements Under the Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program
for Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Geologic Sequestration (GS) Wells, 73 Fed. Reg. 43,535 (proposed
July 25, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.146.81(d)).
152. Id. at 43,503.
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stream as part of their permit application to determine if the injectate is
considered hazardous.”153 If the CO2 stream meets the RCRA definition
of a hazardous substance, then it must be injected under “the more stringent UIC Class I requirements for injection of hazardous waste”154 and
the proposed Class VI category for CCS would not apply. Alternatively,
operators could conduct additional scrubbing to further refine the CO2
stream until it no longer meets the hazardous waste definition.
In contrast, EPA’s analysis of whether CERCLA would apply “depends entirely on the make-up of the specific CO2 stream and of the environmental media (e.g., soil, groundwater) in which it is stored.”155 EPA’s
parting thought on the applicability of CERCLA provides an even
greater disincentive for CCS operators: “As applicable, a determination
of liability would be made on a case-by-case basis by Federal courts in
response to claims for natural resource damages (NRD) or response
costs.”156 Granted, EPA takes great pains to highlight the possible statutory defenses that might be raised by an operator to a CERCLA claim,
most prominently the defense that “the release constituted a ‘federally
permitted release’ as defined in CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 9601(10).”157 Federally permitted releases include “releases in compliance with a UIC permit under SDWA.”158 But these are defenses to claims for natural
resource damages, not exemptions. The difference is a substantial degree
of certainty in the liability exposure—remember CERCLA imposes strict,
joint and several liability, an extreme burden on an operator given the
size and scale of anticipated CCS projects. Perhaps, for example, the operator, unbeknownst to itself and despite clean bills of health from periodic EPA reviews and inspections, was not meeting its permit
conditions, and so the CO2 release might not always be a “federally permitted release.” In such cases the statutory defense might not be
available.
A counterpoint to this concern is that if an operator fails to abide
by the conditions of its permit and injects concentrations of fluids into
the subsurface that qualify the fluids as a hazardous substance, knowingly or not, then perhaps it should be held accountable for a permit
violation under CERCLA. But this approach severely undervalues, if not
disregards, the powerful disincentive of the strict, joint and several liabil153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 43,504.
156. Federal Requirements Under the Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program
for Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Geologic Sequestration (GS) Wells, 73 Fed. Reg. 43,504 (proposed
July 25, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 144 & 146).
157. Id.
158. Id.
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ity standard imposed through CERCLA. Allowing this level of uncertainty and potential liability to loom over nascent CCS projects is
unacceptable. Nonetheless, the importance of holding operators accountable for damages to natural resources cannot be overstated.
The better approach to achieve this policy goal is to ensure that
CERCLA has no authority over injected CO2, but to have equally protective environmental standards in place that specifically address CCS and
its associated concerns without strict, joint and several liability. Because
CERCLA is drafted more broadly than RCRA, however, EPA likely cannot exempt CCS from CERCLA regulation without express statutory exemption from Congress.
B. Financial Responsibility
The SDWA does not “have explicit provisions for financial responsibility, as included in RCRA,” so in its proposed rule EPA relies on
“the general authorities provided under the SDWA authority to prevent
endangerment of USDWs [or underground sources of drinking
water] . . . to set standards for financial responsibility to prevent endangerment of USDWs from improper plugging, remediation, and management of wells after site closure.”159 EPA is to be commended for making a
broad interpretation of its statutory mandate to propose at least some
requirement to demonstrate financial responsibility should corrective action be required prior to the termination of the closure period and for the
period of time during which financial responsibility endures until released by EPA. The problem, as EPA itself points out, is that “[t]he
SDWA authority does not extend to financial responsibility for activities
unrelated to protection of USDWs (e.g., coverage of risks to air, ecosystems, or public health unrelated to USDW endangerment).”160 Therefore,
any financial assurance imposed will necessarily fall short of what is required to be fully, even adequately, protective.
Because authority to implement strong financial assurances is
merely implied under the SDWA, it is susceptible to court challenge.
Susceptibility to court challenge contributes to a cumulative uncertainty
in the robustness of the regulatory framework and reduces the public’s
belief that the system is fully protective. Requirements for financial assurance are a critical component of resource management schemes in
which an operator’s regulated activities stand to impair the environment
or natural resources. When a resource management scheme is proposed
on the scale of CCS, where numerous critical resources stand to be im-

159. Id. at 43,520.
160. Id.
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pacted, strong provisions requiring adequate financial assurance are essential for good public policy and for garnering public confidence.
The proposed rule’s financial assurance provisions are deficient
for the additional reason that the SDWA authority extends only to activities related to the protection of USDWs. That is to say, EPA would be
unjustified in seeking to secure financial assurances from an operator for
impacts to human health unrelated to USDWs, such as vegetation destruction, seismic activity, and other potentially significant and negative
events associated with CCS. This inherent limitation in the rule’s statutory authority means that any financial assurance requirement imposed
by EPA will be necessarily inadequate to cover the full range of potential
environmental and natural resource impacts.
Without broader statutory authority, the public and regulators
cannot be assured that operators will have the resources to cover mitigation or remediation activities. This is a significant shortcoming that
should disqualify the SDWA as the statutory source for authority to regulate CCS. At a minimum, this shortcoming should spur congressional
action to amend SDWA authority to expressly authorize financial assurance requirements specific to CCS activities that cover the full range of
potential impacts from its operations and management. Ideally, however, the issue of financial assurance would be addressed through a separate comprehensive statute specifically regulating anthropogenic
carbon emissions and CCS. This shortcoming demonstrates the inaptness
of SDWA for CCS regulation.
C. Transfer of Liability
While EPA recognizes the importance of transferability,161 the
SDWA does not authorize transfer of financial responsibility162 or longterm liability to third parties or other entities.163 Therefore, EPA’s proposed CCS rule does not include such a provision. This is a significant
problem and impediment to full-scale development of CCS.
While such a prohibition might very well be appropriate for the
protection of drinking water sources, it is a policy out of place when
161. Even though EPA does not propose to regulate transferability in the new proposal,
EPA researched and published alternative means for handling long-term liability, including transferability, in response to stakeholder requests. See U.S. EPA, APPROACHES TO GEOLOGIC SEQUESTRATION SITE STEWARDSHIP AFTER SITE CLOSURE (2008) [hereinafter APPROACHES
TO GEOLOGIC SEQUESTRATION], available at http://www.epa.gov/OGWDW/uic/pdfs/support_uic_co2_stewardshipforsiteclosure.pdf.
162. Federal Requirements Under the Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program
for Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Geologic Sequestration (GS) Wells, 73 Fed. Reg. 43,520 (proposed
July 25, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 144 & 146).
163. Id. at 43,522.
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applied to CCS, again, because of the contemplated scale and size of its
full deployment. If, in the broader market, one party is particularly adept
at sequestration and injection, but has neither the long-term nor financial
wherewithal to contemplate indefinite liability, which another party is
more suited to handling, then CCS regulations should encourage business transactions transferring liability from one party to another to create
a more efficient system. Such a transfer does not lessen the overall liability or create more exposure for the public sector; it merely allows transfers of what was once the injector’s risk exposure to another through a
willing, contractual transaction. At the very least, a comprehensive CCS
framework should provide for, if not encourage, the transfer of liability
and financial responsibility between parties, if not to the public sector.
The Interstate Oil and Gas Conservation Commission (IOGCC)
has developed a model164 that proposes to transfer liability to individual
states, which would manage the long-term care, monitoring, and any
necessary corrective measures by means of a trust fund established during the operational phase of the project by a tax or fee assessed during
injection. Similarly, the European Union (EU) has proposed a CCS directive165 providing that individual nations eventually take on the long-term
care and responsibility for CCS sites. The EU directive even specifies, as
an incentive for private CCS development, that after transfer of responsibility member nations cannot recoup any resulting management or
remediation costs short of demonstrating operator negligence, willful deceit, or failure to exercise due diligence.166
Given the weight of these recommendations, it appears likely that
in the early stages of CCS development some degree of liability transfer
to the public sector may be necessary to accomplish its deployment—at
least until the full contours of the risks and exposures created over the
long-term by these projects are better quantified. In fact, “[n]early all of
the sequestration literature assumes that long-term liability must be
transferred to the public sector to maintain economic viability and to encourage industry participation.”167
New Mexico looked at limited transfers of liability to the state,
such as transferring liability for a limited number of initial CCS projects
“(e.g. the first enhanced oil recovery CCS project, the first deep saline
CCS project, the first deep coal seam CCS project)” or transferring liability “for a limited time frame (e.g. the first five years of [CCS]).”168 Wyo164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

IOGCC 2007, supra note 123.
Directive of the European Parliament and Council, supra note 123.
Id. art. 18, ¶ 7.
NEW MEXICO CCS, supra note 66, at 39.
Id.
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ming Governor Dave Freudenthal, however, recently argued that carbon
management and climate change is “ultimately a national problem” and
that federal lawmakers must act on several key issues or the success of
CCS will be “hampered.”169 In particular, he noted that the federal government will have to “[a]ddress the long-term liability/indemnification
issues surrounding sequestration, as no state will be able to assume the
risk of a catastrophic release of carbon dioxide by itself.”170
If states can’t manage the risks, it seems improbable that corporate entities would have the means to cover this potential exposure. Corporations are designed to raise capital. It is possible, if not likely, that
CCS is or will very soon be the type of technology that attracts huge
sums of private investment, however, this won’t occur until CCS has
been demonstrated to be a commercially, economically, and politically
viable option for climate mitigation. Nor is it likely until CO2 emissions
are subject to federal regulation, either through a carbon tax, or as is
more probable, through a comprehensive cap-and-trade approach. Until
then, corporate entities will tentatively approach CCS development,
given the investment size, risk, and relative uncertainty.
Because long-term containment of CO2 is one of the most significant unknowns of a CCS project, it is precisely this liability that must be
subsidized in some way by the public sector to incentivize private investment. Because the environmental stakes are so great, and because the
problem of climate change mitigation is so clearly national in scope—in
terms of the emissions contributions and the environmental impacts—
this subsidy should properly fall on the federal government in the form
of a liability transfer from the private sector (i.e., the injectors/operators)
to the public sector.
Requiring the public sector to bear some portion of this cost satisfies the policy goal of internalizing the increased societal costs of coal
and energy consumption as part of an overall approach to price the actual cost of energy production. Further, climate change mitigation is ultimately society’s burden to bear, so it is only proper that society heft
some portion of this liability for the long-term.
V. CCS LIABILITY
Before presenting recommendations for a statutory and regulatory
framework, it is useful to generally understand the liabilities inherent in
CCS and possible regulatory analogs. Three primary sources of liability

169. Governor Dave Freudenthal, Carbon Sequestration: A Lawyer’s Cornucopia or Pandora’s Box?, 31 WYO. L. REV. 16, 18 (2008).
170. Id.
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arise from the geologic sequestration of CO2: (1) liability from operational impacts; (2) liability from in situ risks; and (3) climate liability.171 In
addition to these broad categorical risks, a time-based risk component is
also applicable across all three risk categories.172
Operational liability—stemming from the transportation, siting
and injection, and storage of carbon dioxide and other waste materials—
has been managed on a relatively large scale for decades by the U.S. oil
and gas industry in the context of EOR and acid-gas disposal.173 The operations phase of a CCS project begins with siting and injection and ends
with closure (i.e., cessation of injection and well plugging). Some commentators argue that the liabilities and risks inherent in the operations
phase of CCS can be sufficiently managed174 through current statutes,
regulations, and other forms of familiar liability and risk control mechanisms, such as insurance and other contractual agreements, that are already commonplace.175 For example, EPA’s UIC program “[e]liminates
more than nine billion gallons of hazardous waste and a trillion gallons
of oil-field waste from the environment each year,”176 and depending on
the injection well type, imposes on the operator financial responsibility
for a certain number of years and general liability for an indefinite period.177 Industry proponents have argued, therefore, that modifications to
the current regulatory structure could be sufficient to address the unique
nature, risks, and concerns relating to CCS.178 While modification of the
current regulatory framework might be marginally adequate to address
concerns and risks relating to the operational phase of CCS—involving
processes and risks familiar to industry and regulators—mere modification is insufficient for other phases of CCS. Because of the anticipated

171. See M.A. de Figueiredo et al., Framing the Long-Term In Situ Liability Issue for Geologic Carbon Storage in the United States, 10 MITIGATION AND ADAPTATION STRATEGIES FOR
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 647, 648 (2005) [hereinafter Figueiredo I].
172. See generally WILSON ET AL., supra note 17.
173. See, e.g., U.S. EPA’s Program to Regulate the Placement of Waste Water and Other
Fluids Underground, U.S. Envt’l Prot. Agency, June 2004, www.epa.gov/ogwdw/sdwa/
pdfs/fs_30ann_uic_web.pdf (more than 800,000 injection wells have disposed of trillions of
gallons of hazardous and non-hazardous fluids, including oil-field wastes, into subsurface
formations through the SDWA’s Underground Injection Control Program).
174. Figueiredo I, supra note 171, at 647–48.
175. Nettles & Conner, supra note 17, at 47–48.
176. See, e.g., U.S. EPA’s Program to Regulate the Placement of Waste Water and Other
Fluids Underground, supra note 173.
177. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 144.63 (financial responsibility for Class I wells).
178. See, e.g., IOGCC 2007, supra note 123, at 11 (“The Task Force considers the creation
of an industry-funded and state-administered trust fund the most effective and responsive
‘care-taker’ program to provide the necessary oversight during the post-closure period.”).
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scale of CCS, modification is very likely to be inadequate for the operational phase as well.
Climate liability relates to future carbon-control regimes and the
risks associated with atmospheric leakage and the problem of accounting
for those storage losses when credits have been assigned conditioned on
permanent storage.179 This liability boils down to a carbon accountability
and tracking problem; ensuring carbon that has been sequestered remains that way so credits can be properly awarded, and if there are
leaks, determining how they should be accounted for and discounted
given the prevailing carbon pricing structure. This aspect of CCS and its
associated policy concerns is beyond the scope of this paper and will not
be addressed here, although it is a critical issue that needs to be fully
considered for a comprehensive carbon management scheme to be
workable.
In situ liability for CCS, unlike operational liability, creates unique
problems because of the prolonged storage times contemplated180 and
the significant time until carbon-dioxide plume stabilization.181 Longterm liability for CCS projects “presents a unique problem given the anticipated scale, both in terms of time (hundreds to thousands of years)
and space [hundreds of square miles], required for successful CO2 sequestration. . . .”182 For this reason, long-term liability has been identified as one of the most significant barriers to the commercial-scale
deployment of this critical climate change mitigation strategy.183 Risks
associated with this category of liabilities include environmental and
human-health impacts from leaks to the surface, migration of CO2 within
the subsurface, contamination of groundwater, mobilization of subsurface pollutants, and seismic events.184 Some risks, such as potential
groundwater contamination, also fall within the operational risk category, and therefore, are probably sufficiently addressed by current regulations and procedures or by those being proposed, such as EPA’s
proposed UIC rule for CCS. It is the in situ risks associated with the later
phases of a sequestration project—the extended period beginning with
cessation of injection and closure, through the post-closure period to
179. Figueiredo I, supra note 171, at 647–48.
180. See WILSON ET AL., supra note 17, at 3; NEW MEXICO CCS, supra note 66, at 55 (storage times anticipated to be hundreds to thousands of years).
181. See Federal Requirements Under the Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program for Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Geologic Sequestration (GS) Wells, 73 Fed. Reg. 43,519
(proposed July 25, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 144 & 146) (noting that CO2 plumes
have been observed to stabilize in 10–100 years).
182. NEW MEXICO CCS, supra note 66, at 55.
183. See generally id.
184. See Figueiredo I, supra note 171, at 647–648.
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plume stabilization—that are unique to CCS given its scale and require
careful consideration.
The post-closure phase of a CCS project is essentially indefinite
because, barring a future commercial use of the stored CO2 that would
require later extraction, sequestration of CO2 is intended to be permanent.185 Even with an operational phase of 50–100 years, therefore, the
post-closure period of a sequestration project will be the predominant
phase. As such, liability during this phase will be fundamentally different than liability during operations. For example, should an accident or
damage occur after closure “there may be difficulty identifying responsible parties, delegating responsibilities for remediation, and apportioning
damages given that corporations do not have lifetimes as long as the
CCS stewardship period (hundreds of years).”186 Therefore, it will be
“necessary to clarify who will be responsible for long-term site care and
for how long.”187 To avoid imposing unreasonable liability that would
discourage CCS development, a unique approach is required to manage
the resulting risks.
These long-term risks and liabilities, however, are not directly addressed by EPA’s proposed rule, but are implicated by other environmental statutes, such as CERCLA, thereby compounding the liabilities
and uncertainties. The result is unconstrained liability under the proposed UIC rule. Understanding these risks and liabilities, and how they
trigger liabilities under the UIC program itself and implicate other environmental statutes and regulations, is critical to evaluating the appropriateness of EPA’s proposed rule, as well as for proposing a more
workable alternative.
A. Managing Liability—Proposed and Analogous Models
Liability need not be ignored, although EPA’s proposed rule essentially ignores it.188 Rather, CCS liabilities can be actively managed “to
decrease firm [operator] risk and thereby increase market penetration,”189
and in turn increase the climate mitigation success of any CCS program.
In general, three broad options exist to manage liability: (1) transfer of
liability, or some portion thereof, to the public sector; (2) private, contrac-

185. See WILSON ET AL., supra note, 17, at 3–4.
186. Id. at 4.
187. Id.
188. APPROACHES TO GEOLOGIC SEQUESTRATION, supra note 161, at 4 (stating that EPA’s
proposal does not address liability relating to CCS impacts to air, ecosystems, and human
health beyond the scope of the SDWA).
189. Figueiredo I, supra note 171, at 647.
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tual, liability-limiting mechanisms, such as insurance or indemnification;
or (3) some combination thereof.190
Transferring liability to the public sector is one way to limit the
private burden on individual injectors and the industry collectively.191
Proponents of this approach argue that even with substantial technical
knowledge and decades of experience injecting CO2 into the subsurface,
the contemplated scale of full commercial development of CCS introduces a breadth of unknowns that makes the risk of initiating a project too great for a commercial entity to bear alone. If that risk could be
limited in time by transferring ultimate liability to the public sector—
either the federal government or a state government—for the duration of
the project’s lifespan beginning sometime after closure, then injectors
and operators would be encouraged to undertake CCS because the risks
and liabilities would no longer extend indefinitely. Similarly, if financial
liability also could be capped at some outer limit for individual operators
and for the industry collectively, then the financial risks could be incorporated directly into business models. Without a cap, the financial liability is potentially enormous, given the size and scope of CCS projects,
such that no private entity could solely bear the burden.
Public assumption of large private liabilities is not without precedent. A similar concept was originally employed briefly by CERCLA,
which had in its original form created a “Post-Closure Liability Fund.”192
After a maximum five-year period, hazardous waste disposal facility operators could apply to have liability for the future costs of monitoring,
care, and maintenance of the site transferred to the fund. If the hazardous waste disposal facility operator had received the proper permit and
complied with all other regulatory requirements, the fund was then obligated to pay all costs arising from future liabilities imposed by CERCLA.
The idea was that sites that operated within the constraints of their permit, remained trouble free, and did not pose a threat to public health,
welfare, or the environment, qualified for transfer of liability to the fund.
The fund was supported by appropriations, transfers, or credits and was
capped at $200 million.193 In many ways, such a tax was equated with
premium payments for post-closure government liability insurance paid
190. See APPROACHES TO GEOLOGIC SEQUESTRATION, supra note 161, for a helpful review
of some current statutory approaches to managing liability, as well as a summary of recommendations for managing CCS liability.
191. See IOGCC 2007, supra note 123, at 4 (recommending liability be transferred to the
state following a post-closure period of monitoring); see also NEW MEXICO CCS, supra note
66, at 55; Directive of the European Parliament and Council, supra note 123.
192. 42 U.S.C. § 9641 repealed by Pub.L. 99-499, § 514(b), 100 Stat. 1767 (1986).
193. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, Pub.L. No. 96-510, § 232, 94 Stat. 2804 (1980); see CAROLE STERN SWITZER & LYNN A.
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by hazardous waste disposal site owners and operators.194 Like many insurance policies covering high-risk and large liabilities, the fund had a
cap. Unlike the situation when an operator is insured, however, when
the cap was exceeded for a CERCLA action, the operator was free of all
liability because liability had been transferred to the fund (i.e., the federal government). Conversely, when an insurance policy is exceeded, the
policyholder remains on the financial hook.
Not surprisingly, when CERCLA was up for reauthorization in
the mid-1980s solid waste operators sought to retain the post-closure liability fund,195 primarily because it protected them against excessive liabilities. But opponents of the fund, such as the Hazardous Waste
Treatment Council, argued that “[t]he more rapid the transfer of liability
to a federally backed fund, the less incentive there is to pursue permanent and protective methods of management.”196 The Council argued
that liability transfer “exacerbates the cost differential between treatment
and disposal by allowing the long-term cost of facility liability, monitoring and maintenance to be assumed by the Federal government, rather
than having these post-closure expenses internalized in the price of individual and land disposal transactions.”197 Environmental groups attacked the transfer, as well, arguing that it created “an incentive to do the
most modest, minimal cleanup, [and] adopt the most minimal approach,
that would get you by that first five years and not assume responsibility
for the subsequent acceptability of the disposal practice.”198 They also argued that a trust fund was “less accountable” than operators themselves.199 Opponents of the liability transfer ultimately prevailed and the
provision was repealed.
While a public assumption of private risk might not have been
appropriate in the case of hazardous waste, it is being considered as a
viable option for CCS. Both the IOGCC and EU have recently advocated
for a long-term liability model for CCS, similar to the now-defunct CERBULAN, CERCLA: COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT (SUPERFUND) 7 (2002).
194. Superfund Amendments & Reauthorization Act of 1986 Hearing on S. 2892 Before S.
Comm. On Finance, 98th Cong. 67 (Sept. 19, 1984) (statement of Mikel M. Rollyson, acting
tax legislative counsel, Dep’t of the Treas.).
195. Hearing on H.R. 5640 H. Subcomm. on Water Res. of the Comm. on Public Works and
Trans., 98th Cong. 63 (1984) (statement of Richard L. Hanneman, Dir. of Gov. Affairs, Nat.
Solid Waste Mgmt. Assoc.) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 5640].
196. Id. at 211 (statement of Richard C. Fortuna, Exec. Dir., Hazardous Waste Treatment
Council).
197. H. Subcomm. on Commerce, Trans. and Tourism, H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
98th Cong. 197 (1984) (statement of Dr. Nelson Mossholder).
198. Hearing on H.R. 5640, supra note 195, at 474 (1984) (statement of Kenneth Kamlet).
199. Id.
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CLA post-closure liability fund that includes transfer of some, if not
most, of the enduring risks to the public sector. Together these proposals
offer important insights into how governments might incentivize CCS
projects to jumpstart its application and benefits vis-à-vis climate change
mitigation and serve to emphasize the importance of constraining liabilities relating to CCS for policymakers in order to facilitate its development and implementation.
The IOGCC, comprised of 30 member states and seven associate
member states, issued a Model CO2 Storage Statute with Model Rules
and Regulations (Model) in 2007. The IOGCC cites the need to delimit
the parameters of potential liability as a guiding principle. It does so
when it proclaims that the statutory and regulatory framework must be
“seamless to maximize economic and environmental benefits while providing a ‘cradle to grave’ framework with fully integrated regulatory
oversight and clearly identified risk parameters for industry.”200 A further
guiding principle is that the regulatory framework must be simple: “The
temptation to over-regulate for the exotic needed to be avoided by developing a simple framework that initially addressed only those scenarios
most likely to occur. It was recognized that, as necessary, regulations
would be amended in the future based on the experience gained in the
initial projects.”201
Employing these principles, the IOGCC Model recommends that
at the end of a 10-year, post-closure period—during which time the CO2
plume would be monitored for signs of increasing stability and to see
that project conditions continue to meet closure requirements for such
specifications as formation pressure and CO2 containment—the liability
for the storage site should be transferred to the state.202 This serves the
IOGCC’s principle of clearly identifying risk parameters for industry because it provides a temporal liability cap. After the transfer to the public
sector, funding for the continued monitoring of the site, and for any compensatory disbursements that might be necessary for environmental or
human-health impacts, would be paid for from a trust fund created by a
tax or fee imposed on storage operators during the operations phase.203
The trust fund, managed by the state regulatory agency currently in
charge of CO2 injection would then assume future management of the

200. IOGCC 2007, supra note 123, at 2 (emphasis added).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 11, 29 (recommending that states, not the federal government, maintain longterm care and control of sequestration sites because states have developed the regulatory
and technical expertise relating to CO2 injection).
203. Id. at 34.
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CCS project during the entire post-closure period, including future monitoring, verification, and remediation activities.204
Recognizing CCS as “a bridging technology that will contribute to
mitigating climate change,”205 the EU has also set about creating a regulatory framework “to incentivize Member State and private sector investments to ensure the construction and operation by 2015 of up to 12 CCS
demonstration plants.”206 As part of this broad effort to incentivize CCS,
the proposed EU Directive, adopted December 17, 2008, makes a recommendation similar to the IOGCC. Specifically, the EU recommends that a
storage site should be deemed closed once specifications for closure conditions defined in the permit have been met and after a period of postclosure responsibility, during which the operator maintains full responsibility for maintenance, monitoring, and corrective measures.207 After this
post-closure period has elapsed, “[t]he responsibility for the storage site,
including specific legal obligations, should be transferred to the competent [national] authority, if and when all available evidence indicates that
the stored CO2 will be completely contained for the indefinite future.”208
The EU Directive provides that the post-closure period “shall be no
shorter than 20 years, unless the competent authority is convinced that”
the stored CO2 will be completely and permanently contained “before
the end of that period.”209 As part of the transfer process, operators must
establish that the CO2 has been permanently contained by demonstrating
“the conformity of the actual behaviour of the injected CO2 with the
modelled behaviour; the absence of any detectable leakage; that the storage site is evolving towards a situation of long-term stability.”210
All costs associated with future monitoring and corrective measures211 are to be born by the public sector: “There should be no recovery
of costs incurred by the competent authority from the former operator
after the transfer of responsibility except in the case of a fault or negligence of the operator prior to the transfer of responsibility for the storage
site.”212 To offset anticipated costs to the public sector, the EU recom204. Id. at 11, 29.
205. Directive of the European Parliament and Council, supra note 123, ¶ 5.
206. Id. ¶ 10.
207. Id. ¶¶ 31, 32.
208. Id. ¶ 33; see also id. art. 18 (Transfer of Responsibility).
209. Id. art. 18 1(b).
210. Directive of the European Parliament and Council, art. 18 2(a)–(c).
211. Id. ¶ 37.
212. Id. ¶ 35; see also id. at 170, art. 18, ¶ 7 (“In cases where there has been fault of the
operator, including cases of deficient data, concealment of relevant information, negligence, willful deceit or malpractice the competent authority shall recover from the former
operator the costs incurred after the transfer of responsibility has taken place,” otherwise,
“there shall be no further recovery of costs after the transfer of responsibility.”).
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mends that “[a] financial contribution . . . be made available by the operator to the competent authority . . . [that] should at least cover the
anticipated cost of monitoring for a period of 30 years.”213 After transfer
to the public sector, “routine inspections . . . shall cease and monitoring
may be reduced to a level which allows for identification of leakages or
significant irregularities. If any leakages or significant irregularities are
detected, monitoring shall be intensified as required to assess the scale of
the problem and the effectiveness of corrective measures.”214
Another means of constraining liability is through a tiered liability
scheme, where costs covered in the first tier are solely the responsibility
of the individual operator, costs within the second tier are the responsibility of the industry as a whole, and any costs in excess of the first two
tiers are born by the public sector. The Price-Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act (Price-Anderson Act)215 essentially does this by limiting operator liability to a $300 million insurance policy, plus a $95.8
million cap for each incident (not to exceed $15 million in any given
year) that comprises a pooled-risk fund to cover the industry’s aggregate
public liability, which now stands at approximately $10 billion. This approach implicitly establishes the public sector as the default bearer of
operator liability beyond that covered by the first two tiers—individual
operators’ private insurance and the industry’s aggregate public
liability.216
By enacting the Price-Anderson Act, Congress sought to help encourage private investment in commercial nuclear power by placing a
cap on the total liability each nuclear plant operator faced in the event of
a catastrophic accident and the total liability the industry would bear
collectively.217 The Price-Anderson Act provides that, in the event a nuclear incident results in damages in excess of the amount of the industry’s aggregate public liability, “Congress will thoroughly review the
particular incident . . . and take whatever action is determined to be
necessary (including approval of appropriate compensation plans and
appropriation of funds) to provide full and prompt compensation to the
public for all public liability claims resulting from a disaster of such
magnitude.”218

213. Id. ¶ 37.
214. Id. art. 18 6.
215. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2000).
216. NEW MEXICO CCS, supra note 66, at 41.
217. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Fact Sheet on Nuclear Insurance and Disaster Relief Funds, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/funds-fs.
html.
218. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e)(2) (2000).
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The Price-Anderson Act, however, is designed to provide coverage during the operational phase of commercial nuclear reactors, when the
risk of catastrophic events is greatest. What this approach does not address, unlike the CERCLA post-closure liability fund or the IOGCC or
EU proposals, therefore, is responsibility for long-term liability. The
Price-Anderson Act contemplates a viable, solvent industry of entities to
maintain insurance premiums and from which the an aggregate public
liability, or pooled-risk fund can be generated. So, while the risks for
CCS are greatest during the operational phase, making the Price-Anderson Act a viable analog for constraining liability during operations, the
Price-Anderson Act is unsuited to address long-term liabilities unique to
CCS. Because of the long-term nature of the risks inherent in CCS, any
liability framework must contemplate a mechanism that will outlive the
life of an operator.
Alternatively, numerous private mechanisms, such as self-insurance, bonding, and requirements for financial assurance, insurance, and
pooled risk, exist to defray risk and to cover liabilities that arise from
such projects. Generally, self-insurance, bonding, and financial assurance
mechanisms are best suited for covering liabilities during the operations
phase of projects because these mechanisms contemplate a viable entity
capable of generating and sustaining funds to cover liabilities. Because
these risk-management devices do not address long-term in situ liabilities, they will not be considered in any further detail.
Insurers indemnify individuals and operators against a dizzying
array of risks through traditional insurance policy approaches and, increasingly, through innovative insurance products, such as catastrophe
bonds.219 Given these innovations in insurance products and years of
technical data on CO2 injection, some insurance companies may be willing to bear the risk of indemnifying some parts, if not all, of a CCS project.220 The availability of insurance for CCS and its affordability will
probably ultimately depend on how well the indemnified risks can be
quantified.221 While general risk assessments of CCS technology may
prove helpful initially, site-specific assessments will ultimately be required for each operation222 given the variability in geologic conditions
and associated risk factors (e.g., faulting and seismic zones; number and
location of perforating wells; quality of primary geologic containment
strata; existence, if at all, of secondary containment; and distance to near-

219. Christina Ross et al., Limiting Liability in the Greenhouse: Insurance Risk-Management
Strategies in the Context of Global Climate Change, 43A STAN. J. INT’L L. 251, 311 (2007).
220. See Figueiredo I, supra note 171, at 654.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 654.
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est underground source of drinking water), as well as the potential interests and property at stake (e.g., remote location with low property
values, or numerous, densely occupied structures with high property
values) for each site.
It is worth noting, in this regard, the experience of CERCLA and
the concerns raised by insurers and the hazardous materials and chemical industry at the time of its reauthorization in the mid-1980s. The
courts have interpreted CERCLA to impose strict, joint and several liability that is retroactive,223 creating nearly unlimited liability on the part of
any and all parties associated with a hazardous waste site. Coupled with
the near certainty of leakage at these sites, insurers testified that CERCLA made many hazardous waste activities uninsurable.224 In the case of
hazardous waste, insurers argued that numerous parties might be responsible for delivering waste to a given site over subsequent decades,
so identifying parties and allocating their culpability would be difficult
and would be arbitrary if done through joint and several liability.225 Imposition of strict liability was also an impediment to insurance because
even if an insured acted with reasonable care and according to industry
practice and procedure, violating no regulations, they could still be held
liable for harm done through no fault of their own.226
Insurers also argued during Senate hearings on CERCLA’s
reauthorization that “because of the near certainty that leakage will occur
and the open-ended nature of the resulting liability,” it was impossible
for the private sector to provide insurance.227 As a consequence, pollution
insurance became difficult to acquire. Following the reauthorization of
CERCLA and RCRA, one legal commentator noted that “[i]nsurers no
longer offer pollution policies because of unpredictable judicial determinations of the scope and extent of insurer liability. The future availability
of pollution insurance is doubtful.”228

223. Lewis M. Barr, CERCLA Made Simple: An Analysis of the Cases Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 45 BUS. LAW. 923, 976
(1990).
224. Judith M. Nixon, The Problem with RCRA—Do the Financial Responsibility Provisions
Really Work?, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 133, 156 (1986) (“Open-ended insurer liability forced insurers out of the pollution insurance market by the early 1980s.”).
225. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986: Before the S. Comm. On Environment and Public Works, 99th Cong. 87–95 (1985).
226. Id. at 140–41.
227. Insurance Issues and Superfund: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 99th Cong. 35 (1985) (statement of William O. Bailey, president of Aetna Life &
Casualty and the immediate past chairman of the American Insurance Assoc.) [hereinafter
Insurance Issues and Superfund Hearing].
228. Nixon, supra note 224, at 136.
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Where independent insurers offer no coverage or when coverage
falls short, numerous private options remain available to operators, including an industry pooled-risk approach. The Price-Anderson Act,229
discussed above in the context of liability caps, employs such a pooledrisk approach by requiring licensed operators to contribute to a fund to
cover public compensation claims for personal injuries and property
damage in excess of privately available insurance—which they are also
required to hold in the amount of $300 million. Each licensee is responsible for a maximum contribution to the fund of up to $95.8 million for any
single accident, but no licensee must pay more than $15 million for any
given accident in a single year.230 Further, the contribution can be a deferred premium guaranteed through a variety of credit options, such as a
surety bond, letter of credit, revolving credit or a term-loan arrangement,
maintenance of escrow deposits of government securities, annual certified financial statement showing that cash can be generated and made
available, or other type of guarantee “as may be approved by the [Nuclear Regulatory] Commission.”231 Because there are more than 100 commercial nuclear reactors in the United States, the fund stands to raise
approximately $10 billion for a single nuclear incident in addition to the
$300 million in insurance held by each individual reactor operator.
But all of these private mechanisms implicitly, if not expressly,
contemplate coverage during the operations phase of a project because
the nature of each mechanism generally requires a solvent entity to be in
existence in order to initiate the funding mechanism in question. One
possible exception are funds created through a tax or pro-rata payments.
These funds ostensibly are contemplated to endure, possibly as a trust,
beyond the lifespan of the operators, such as the funds proposed by the
IOGCC and the EU. This is a critical shortcoming of private mechanisms.
No one contemplates or expects operating companies that undertake
CCS to be persistent, at least not to the extent that they might still be
extent one or two centuries after closure. For this reason, as well other
institutional reasons, the public sector is seen as the default holder of
long-term liability.232 But at what point that transfer should occur and
how much liability ought to be transferred are critical questions that
need to be addressed so the public can have confidence entrusting operators to undertake these projects.

229. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2000).
230. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(b)(1) (2000).
231. 10 C.F.R. § 140.21 (2008).
232. Much in the way the federal government has become the default holder/shepherd/caretaker of commercial nuclear waste in the form of spent nuclear rods intended for
the federal underground repository at Yucca Mountain.
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B. Legislative Limits to Liability
In addition to assigning liability by defining financial responsibilities or by transferring liability after a specified time to the public sector,
liability can also be constrained or managed by statutorily defining the
legal standard of proof necessary to establish fault for various triggering
events, such as catastrophic leaks, subsurface trespass, nuisance, and
contamination of drinking water sources. Among the benefits of this approach are “the predictability and public confidence gained that could
eliminate to some extent the uncertainty that would otherwise serve as
an impediment to [CCS] development.”233 Without clear statutory language dictating liability standards, “injectors, insurers, and the public
must await the uncertain process of litigation for the courts to determine
applicable liability standards.”234 Below are five possible ways to statutorily constrain CCS liability.
1. Negligence
In general, “[w]hen a legislative provision protects a class of persons by proscribing or requiring certain conduct but does not provide a
civil remedy . . . the court may . . . accord to an injured member . . . a
right of action, using a suitable existing tort action or a new cause of
action analogous to an existing tort action.”235 When determining
whether the standard of care was breached for such actions, courts may
treat statutory or regulatory standards as the standard of care if the legislature did not specify one. If the action in question is demonstrated to
violate the statute or regulation, then a court may find that the action is
negligence per se, which applies only when “the actor violates a statute
that is designed to protect against the type of accident the actor’s conduct causes, and if the accident victim is within the class of persons the
statute is designed to protect.”236 Negligence per se may be susceptible to
traditional tort defenses.237 Courts may also find that the action violating
a statute or regulation establishes strict liability on the part of the defendant.238 A third possibility is that violation of the statute or regulation

233. NEW MEXICO CCS, supra note 66, at 59–60.
234. Id. at 61.
235. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874A.
236. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 14 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001).
237. Id. § 14 cmt. (b).
238. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874A cmt. j (noting that violation of a statute or
regulation may be treated by courts as creating strict liability).
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merely serves as evidence of negligence, but that is the case, generally,
only when the statute specifies such.239
Either of these three approaches to statutory negligence, which
are often court imposed and vary by jurisdiction, can be adopted legislatively to create a mandated standard of care. This approach would give
Congress further control to fine-tune liability for private claims of negligence ranging from the most burdensome, per se liability, to the least, as
when a statutory or regulatory violation is mere evidence of negligence.
Depending on the public policy goal, each has its place. In the case of
CCS, any statute or regulation guiding its development will be somewhat untested. As such, it might be presumptuous to allow CCS statutes
or regulations to establish a firm standard of care in negligence actions or
for the standards to be legislatively mandated. For this reason, expressly
providing that violations of the applicable statutes and regulations are
mere evidence in support of negligence might provide the greatest flexibility at the outset of this technology.
2. Strict Liability
The hazardous waste industry has long held that strict liability is
a harsh standard as applied under CERCLA and RCRA. Unlike a negligence standard, operators are held liable even if they follow the applicable standard of reasonable care and violate no regulation or industry
practice. The American Insurance Association has argued that strict liability as applied in CERCLA verges on a standard of absolute liability and
improperly lacks any contextual evaluation of the conduct or nature of
the activities of the defendant.240 The Association has also argued that
strict liability “necessarily depreciates incentives otherwise available to
encourage defendants to act carefully and responsibly,” because they are
held liable regardless of their actions.241
Two important public policy goals, however, are clearly served by
imposing strict liability: (1) hazardous waste clean up; and (2) deterrence.242 The theory behind imposition of strict liability is that it increases
the accountability of responsible parties, which in turn motivates operators to enact conservative operating procedures and protective measures
to avoid leaks, spills, or other events triggering liability. In the case of
239. Id. at § 288B(2), cmt. (d) (“Under some circumstances, however, the fact of the violation may still be accepted as relevant evidence bearing upon the conduct of a reasonable
man in the actor’s position.”).
240. Hearing on H.R. 5640, supra note 195, at 628 (statement of The American Insurance
Ass’n).
241. Id.
242. Edmund B. Frost, Strict Liability as an Incentive for Cleanup of Contaminated Property,
25 HOUS. L. REV. 951, 951 (1988).
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CERCLA, the strict liability standard “is both broader and narrower than
the owner’s liability under the common law” strict liability standard.243
“It is broader because it can attach whenever a facility is contaminated
with any hazardous substances warranting response costs,” and “narrow[er] because it applies only to response costs (costs of investigation
and cleanup), natural resources damages, and the cost of health assessments,” but does not apply “to any liability for personal injury or any
third party economic damages which may be attributed to the condition.”244 CERCLA’s application of strict liability, therefore, achieves the
public policy goal of ensuring operator accountability for high-priority
trigger events focused on public health and environmental protection,
while essentially limiting liability for claims arising from individual or
economic impacts on the private sector, which can reasonably be expected to be more properly and efficiently handled through private tort
actions. Further, strict liability also tends to reduce uncertainty for responsible parties and “probably makes claims more predictable than
they would be under a negligence standard” for example.245 Claims
would be more predictable because it is generally easier to foresee when
and under what conditions the subject parties will be held accountable,
due to the fact that the extent of responsibility is more clearly defined,
even if the liability is greater.246 But because strict liability imposes substantial liability on responsible parties, its imposition is properly reserved, at least in its application at common law, for activities deemed to
be abnormally dangerous or ultra-hazardous.247
3. Joint and Several Liability
Joint and several liability, depending on how expansive or constrained the applicable statutory language is, holds multiple parties fully
responsible for all applicable consequences of a triggering event no matter their degree of fault. In the context of environmental protection, joint
and several liability creates assurance for the public that someone will be
held responsible for natural resource damages, similar to the strict liability standard, and so achieves the important public policy goal of accountability. Also like strict liability, joint and several liability can result
in a significant expansion of liability because, and depending on how the
applicable statute is drafted, any party may be held wholly responsible

243. Id. at 952.
244. Id. at 952–53.
245. Jeffrey Kehne, Encouraging Safety Through Insurance-Based Incentives: Financial Responsibility for Hazardous Wastes, 96 YALE L.J. 403, 419 (1986).
246. See generally id.
247. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 932–33 (8th ed. 2004).
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for damages relating to an environmental impact regardless of fault. Of
the well-known federal environmental statutes, joint and several liability
is probably best known through CERCLA.
Hazardous waste site managers, handlers, and transporters—all
liable under CERCLA’s joint and several liability standard—chaffed
against its application to them because the standard held small handlers
and transporters, who may have contributed only nominal quantities of
hazardous substances to release sites, liable for the full amount of
cleanup costs and resource damages.248 The hazardous waste industry
argued that contrary to congressional intent, “[b]y imposing joint and
several liability, potentially responsible parties have no incentive to
come forward, absent an enforcement action, to initiate a voluntary
cleanup . . . [so this] not only discourages responsible corporate behavior, but it also guarantees cleanups will have to be initiated under adversarial conditions.”249
Others have argued that Congress imposed joint and several liability in CERCLA as a means to ensure accountability and responsibility,
and to achieve a speedy, extra-judicial settlement among the potentially
responsible parties.250 The idea is that the parties who handled the waste,
or managed the waste sites, have the best and most accurate information
regarding who was responsible for what and when. Therefore, the parties should be able to work out amongst themselves their contributions,
without having to litigate the matter.251 Joint and several liability “appropriately reverses or transfers the burden of proof to those who do have
the knowledge or should have the knowledge of what materials went to
those sites and that it is in their best interest to negotiate among themselves and come forward with a settlement.”252 For this reason in particular, joint and several liability is arguably a logical, perhaps even a
necessary standard of liability when applied to situations where there is
much factual information to sort out, such as at hazardous waste sites,
and where numerous parties might be responsible over a period of
decades.

248. See Hearing on H.R. 5640, supra note 195, at 628.
249. Id. at 518–19 (statement of John J. Fitzpatrick, Jr., American Petroleum Institute).
250. See Insurance Issues and Superfund Hearing, supra note 227, at 87–95 (statement of F.
Henry Habicht, II, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice).
251. See id.
252. Insurance Issues and Superfund Hearing, supra note 227, at 29 (statement of Thomas
C. Jorling, Professor of Environmental Studies, Williams College).

R
R
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4. Alternative Liability
Alternative liability shifts the burden of proving causation from
the petitioner or plaintiff to the respondents or defendants—but only after the petitioner has met an initial threshold of proof—in situations
where it is clear that a harm occurred and that one of the defendants is
responsible, but when it is unclear which defendant.253 Alternative liability is especially useful when there are multiple defendants and the evidence is not sufficient to establish which are responsible. If the
defendants are not able to produce evidence that is exculpatory or
demonstrate that another defendant is responsible, then all the defendants bear equally full responsibility. While alternative liability is not employed universally at common law, it has been urged as a viable solution
for difficult toxic tort cases when establishing responsibility for the environmental harm is often a bar to recovery.254 The plaintiff must still establish a harm and must demonstrate that one of the alleged defendants
is responsible, but the plaintiff need not prove which one. Once that
proof has been made, the burden shifts to the defendants to exculpate
themselves or to establish culpability in another, much like the common
law doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.255 Comments to the Restatement specify
that alternative liability applies only “where it is proved that each of two
or more actors has acted tortiously.”256 The Restatement also notes that in
the common law application of alternative liability “all of the actors involved have been joined as defendants . . . [and] [a]ll . . . have involved conduct simultaneous in time, or substantially so, and all of them
have involved conduct of substantially the same character, creating substantially the same risk of harm, on the part of each actor.”257
Alternative liability serves several important policy goals worthy
of consideration. First, in its absence, wrongdoers who actually cause
harm to plaintiffs likely avoid liability “merely because the harm which
he has inflicted has combined with similar harm inflicted by other
wrongdoers,” creating what is arguably an injustice.258 Given an estab-

253. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433(B)(3).
254. See, e.g., Melinda H. Van der Reis, An Amendment for the Environment: Alternative
Liability and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1269 (1994).
255. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 17. Res ipsa loquitur has several court-imposed
formulations that vary by jurisdiction. The approach intended here, and that overlaps with
alternative liability, follows the reasoning that “if the type of accident usually happens
because of negligence, and if the negligence, when it occurs, is usually that of the defendant, rather than of some other party,” then such circumstantial evidence may be sufficient
to establish a prima facie case of negligence. Id.
256. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433(B) cmt. (g).
257. Id. § 433(B)(3) cmt. (h).
258. Id. § 433(B)(3) cmt. (d).
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lished wrong and proof that one of several potentially responsible parties is at fault, a defendant “may justly be required to assume the burden
of producing that evidence, or if he is not able to do so, of bearing the
full responsibility.”259 Alternative liability, then, may hold responsible
parties more accountable and “permits and encourages enforcement of
environmental protection statutes,” leading to “greater compliance . . . and to more careful action by those handling, storing, and
transporting”260 regulated materials.
California has extended alternative liability to environmental
cases in which proving causation among numerous potential defendants
has proved impossible.261 Alternative liability can also be statutorily imposed, especially in situations where more traditional burdens of proof
might be difficult to meet, despite clear wrongdoing, and where a significant lapse of time between an event and the resulting injury is likely.262
Alternative liability can also make many environmental laws more workable by making parties more certain of their responsibility263 and by encouraging enforcement by lowering the burden of proof.
5. Liability Caps
As discussed in the context of transferring liability to the public
sector, legislatively imposed liability caps—either limits on the time of
responsibility or financial caps—can be an important means of constraining the liability of potentially responsible parties.
Temporal liability caps, such as those proposed by the IOGCC (a
10-year closure period of responsibility after the operations phase) and
the EU (a minimum 20-year, post-closure period of responsibility after
the operations phase to terminate after certain conditions are met), serve
to effectively cut off the legal and financial liability of responsible parties
in a clear and effective way. With temporal liability limits, insurers, investors and principals, regulators, and the public all have advanced
knowledge about the extent of party liability and when responsibility
may be severed. In the IOGCC and EU proposals, the temporal liability
caps are conditional and assume termination of liability only when sequestration projects effectively demonstrate that they have met pre-determined conditions. All of this certainty provides stakeholders the
foreknowledge necessary to plan and to anticipate responsibilities and

259. Id.
260. Van der Reis, supra note 254, at 1270, 1287.
261. Id. at 1284–87.
262. Id. at 1287–89 (recommending Congress to amend RCRA to impose alternative
liability).
263. Id.

R
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risks for various scenarios, but most importantly, to plan and anticipate
worst-case scenarios. That is, the risk is not open ended and, assuming
regulatory storage conditions can be met, all potential risks have a terminus. Financial caps on liability serve the same purpose, but in many
ways provide greater certainty because responsible parties know that
they cannot be held accountable for damages in excess of the cap. For
investment purposes and calculating a potential return on investment,
such certainty is significant. The critical feature of both caps, especially
when employed together, is that they have a strong tendency to encourage development of technologies and projects that might not otherwise be undertaken due to significant uncertainties regarding ultimate
liability.
By employing some combination of each of these statutory constraints on liability—negligence, strict liability, joint and several liability,
alternative liability, and financial liability caps—a CCS scheme can be
crafted that is both flexible and sensitive enough to impose appropriate
burdens on the highest risks associated with CCS.
VI. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY RECOMMENDATIONS
A statutory and regulatory framework implementing CCS ought
to balance the dual policy goals of encouraging private investment with
the overriding aim of protecting critical natural resources, the environment, human health and property by holding polluters accountable. To
encourage private investment, a statutory and regulatory framework for
CCS must limit long-term and catastrophic liabilities but, at the same
time, it must avoid an undue liability transfer to the public sector for
public policy reasons. For any CCS development, critical environmental
and natural resource values must be protected for current and future
uses. This means that all potential drinking water sources, including
brackish waters, petroleum and natural gas reserves and other mineral
deposits, as well as surface resources, such as crops and vegetation, must
be considered and protected within a regulatory paradigm that contemplates the unique environmental impacts of carbon. However, the regulatory paradigm must also anticipate potential future subsurface and
surface conflicts with other resources and the environment.
For the reasons discussed herein, EPA’s proposed rule fails to
achieve this balance, in large part, because EPA’s selected regulatory vehicle, the SDWA, is too narrowly focused on the protection of subsurface
drinking water sources. It was created for that purpose, not to address
CCS and climate mitigation, so it does not contemplate the full range of
potential impacts and liability issues presented by CCS. Therefore, EPA’s
proposal is ill-suited for CCS.
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Rather than attempt to cram CCS and climate mitigation into federal statutes that never contemplated such an application, a wholly
unique statutory and regulatory framework should be developed. This
regulatory framework should comprehensively manage carbon or, at
least, regulate carbon from the point of its emission until it is successfully
sequestered and stabilized within the earth’s subsurface.
To achieve the requisite impetus for private development of CCS,
a legal framework overseeing its operation must, where feasible, decrease the legal and regulatory uncertainties inherent in an undertaking
of the size and scale of CCS. A legal and regulatory framework must
exempt CCS from certain key environmental statutes and regulations
that were never intended to regulate CCS. These statutes and regulations
are ill-suited to regulate CCS, particularly, because of the liability standards that are onerous or uncertain when applied to CCS. A CCS framework, therefore, must limit operator liability, in terms of time of
responsibility and in terms of an absolute dollar figure. As part of this
effort to decrease uncertainty and to control liabilities, a CCS framework
ought to impose clear standards of liability on specific parties for specific
occurrences.
Below is an outline of key statutory and regulatory recommendations that are explored in the following section:
1. Exempt CCS from the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA), the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act (CERCLA), the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), as
well as from the Clean Air Act (CAA) and the Clean Water Act (CWA).
2. Regulate climate change through a unique, comprehensive, and
integrated statutory and regulatory framework from emissions to
mitigation.
3. Statutorily limit CCS operator liability by:
A. Providing for the transfer of legal and financial liability to
third parties, as well as for the transfer of long-term care, monitoring,
and remediation to the federal government after sufficient time has
elapsed and data collected to ensure successful containment; and
B. Capping the total amount of damages for each individual operator and for the CCS industry as a whole through the federal indemnity of occurrences exceeding a pre-defined amount.
4. Statutorily define legal liabilities through a tiered framework
A. Limit demonstrable violations of CCS statutes and regulations to mere evidence of negligence or to establishing prima facie negligence, rather than establishing negligence per se;
B. Impose strict liability in a limited number of cases, to be defined as extraordinary circumstances, such as contamination of under-
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ground sources of drinking water or catastrophic releases of CO2 to the
surface or overlying geologic strata;
C. Apply alternative liability, shifting the burden of proof to the
CCS operator after a nominal demonstration of impact or damage by the
petitioner or movant for certain circumstances probably related to CCS
activities; and
D. Impose a negligence standard for all other impacts and
occurrences.
A. Statutory Exemptions
While it appears possible that CCS can be exempted from RCRA
by EPA itself through a carefully restrictive definition of “CO2 stream,”
the same approach does not appear to work for CERCLA for which a
statutory exemption is likely necessary to preclude operator liability.
Therefore, the uncertainty of CERCLA’s applicability and its crippling
strict, joint and several liability will likely serve as a strong deterrent to
robust private development of CCS. Such a disincentive will make the
prospects of achieving CO2 reductions necessary to stabilize climate
change more unlikely. Further, under the SDWA, EPA has regulatory
authority through the UIC over all underground injections but for a few
exceptions, including “storage of natural gas . . . and specific hydraulic
fracturing fluids.”264 Because CCS is not contemplated to fit within one of
these statutory exceptions and because EPA expressly believes that it
was Congress’ intent for it to regulate CCS through the UIC,265 CCS operators will be subject to the liability framework of the UIC and essentially
subject to unlimited legal liability.266 This merely compounds the uncertainty of the proposed CCS regulatory framework.
Consequently, it is in the best interests of national climate change
policy to exempt CCS from all potentially applicable federal environmental statutes and to craft a statutory and regulatory framework with
the unique environmental and liability factors of CCS in mind. Such a
framework must balance the policy goals of encouraging CCS development to achieve significant near-term CO2 emissions reductions with
concerns for transferring an undue share of project liability to the public

264. Federal Requirements Under the Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program
for Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Geologic Sequestration (GS) Wells, 73 Fed. Reg. 43,491, 43,496
(proposed July 25, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 144 & 146).
265. Id.
266. Id. at 43,522 (“[O]wners or operators may still be held responsible after the postinjection site care period has ended” and the “[t]rust responsibility for potential impacts to
USDWs remains with the owner or operator indefinitely under current SDWA
provisions.”).
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sector, all against the backdrop of protecting against degradation of
human health, the environment, and critical natural resources.
In consideration of these countervailing factors, a comprehensive
CCS framework should impose environmental standards on CCS development of equal or greater rigor as the statutes from which it would be
exempted. So while CCS should be exempted from the SDWA, RCRA,
and CERCLA, among possibly other federal statutes, such as the CAA
and the CWA, it should not be exempted from the principles contained
within them; protection of human health, the environment, and critical
natural resources are to be the paramount concerns.
B. Comprehensive Regulation of Anthropogenic CO2 from Emissions
to Mitigation
CCS regulation should be integrated within a comprehensive legal framework addressing emissions of anthropogenic carbon and its
mitigation. Carbon probably ought not be regulated as an air pollutant
within the framework of the Clean Air Act. While the reasoning for this
particular statement is beyond the scope of this paper, the gist is that
while the Clean Air Act is well-suited to control and regulate emissions
of toxic pollutants with localized effects, it may be less adept at regulating greenhouse gas emissions that are not toxic and do not have localized effects. It is also not at all clear that the Clean Air Act is well-suited
to regulate emissions from dispersed and mobile sources, which account
for a significant portion of carbon dioxide emissions.267 Emissions reductions are but one aspect of CO2 control and management. Any framework that seeks to limit CO2 must go beyond emissions controls to
employ a broader management scheme.
CO2 is emitted from a vast array of sources that the Clean Air Act
was not designed to regulate and would be inept at controlling, such as
homes and buildings, as well as individual cars, trucks, and other mobile
sources. In the United States, these sources account for more than 1.8
megatons of greenhouse gas emissions, the second-largest source of
greenhouse gas emissions.268 Whether carbon emissions are regulated

267. See Editorial, Regulating Carbon: EPA rules under the Clean Air Act aren’t the way to do
the job, but a carefully crafted tax might be, WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 2009, at A12 (arguing that the
Clean Air Act “enacted in 1970, was never intended to deal with greenhouse gases and is
not suited to that task”), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2009/03/23/AR2009032302024.html.
268. U.S. EPA, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990–2007 ES4 (EXECUTIVE SUMMARY) (2009) (EPA measures carbon dioxide equivalent in teragrams,
which is the same numeric value as megatons), available at http://www.epa.gov/climate
change/emissions/downloads09/07Inventory.pdf.

\\server05\productn\N\NMN\49-3-4\NMN3405.txt

934

unknown

Seq: 52

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

8-JUN-10

15:39

[Vol. 49

through an industry-specific, cap-and-trade scheme or through a broadbased carbon tax, the regulation of anthropogenic carbon ought to be
approached holistically to achieve maximum effect, targeting mitigation
and emissions reductions throughout CO2’s life-cycle. Because CO2 is unlike any emissions regulated, it requires a unique regulatory framework
for climate change mitigation to be effectively realized.
Including CCS within a unitary comprehensive legal framework
would essentially allow Congress to approach the regulation of CCS
from scratch and avoid having to work within multiple statutory
frameworks that might be implicated by the regulation of CO2. Rather
than implicating multiple environmental statutes—regulations that
failed to contemplate mitigating or reducing greenhouse gas emissions
and that have specific purposes and goals, which may conflict with carbon regulation and mitigation—Congress should instead approach carbon emissions as a distinct and discrete environmental challenge.
This approach is no different than the way all previous major environmental problems were originally addressed legislatively. Pollution
in America’s waterways was addressed by the CWA, which regulates
the discharge of pollutants into water bodies; air pollution was curtailed
by the CAA; drinking water sources are now protected by the SDWA;
solid waste is regulated by the Solid Waste Act; and hazardous materials
are regulated by RCRA and CERCLA. The list goes on. Addressing the
growing problem of carbon emissions should be no different; there
should be a Climate Change Mitigation Act that specifically addresses
carbon emissions, controls, and mitigation.
C. Statutory Limits on Liability
Within this unitary framework, CCS will play a significant role in
the early stages of climate mitigation until the global economy is able to
shift away from fossil-based fuels. Despite this prediction, the implementation of CCS on a commercial scale has been stunted; notwithstanding
strong technical understanding of the process and years of experience
injecting significant volumes of CO2 into various subsurface formations.
As discussed above, the chief impediment to commercial deployment is
uncertainty regarding the legal and regulatory framework guiding its
development and questions about what level of liability will be imposed.
This uncertainty can be addressed directly through clear statutory limits
on liability drafted in a way that still imposes responsibility on operators
and other principles, but that does not create open-ended liability.
There are two important and general ways a CCS statute should
limit operator liability: (1) provide for the transfer of liability generally,
as well as for the transfer of long-term care, monitoring, and remediation
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of the project site to the federal government,269 after sufficient time has
elapsed and data have been collected to ensure that injected CO2 has
been successfully contained and after the risk of catastrophic failure has
significantly decreased; and (2) cap the total amount of damages each
operator would be individually responsible for and that the CCS industry would be collectively responsible for.
Providing for the transfer of liability generally promotes an efficient market. Operators ought to be able to freely transfer their financial
liabilities to entities that might be better positioned to manage the risk.
This approach, as discussed above, promotes a more efficient distribution of risk and liability and encourages operators with expertise in CCS
to undertake a project without fear that they will be unable to extricate
themselves at a later date.
Transferring full financial and legal liability to the public sector,
assuming the project meets certain permit conditions as prerequisites,
sets a finite time frame during which an operator could be responsible
for the project. Having clearly defined and highly protective transfer
conditions provides operators a strong incentive to employ best practices
so long-term, indefinite liability can be relinquished and avoided. The
time to transference must not be too short so that stability of the CO2
plume is still uncertain or shifting, or so operators are encouraged to
operate shortsightedly. A period of 50 years, as recommended by EPA in
its proposed rule as the period for post-closure financial responsibility, is
probably a reasonable time frame given the paucity of data on time to
stability, with the possibility of transfer occurring sooner if the operator
can demonstrate that the CO2 plume is adequately contained. Critical to
this free-and-clear transference to federal responsibility is the exception
that an operator will remain liable should there be a subsequent finding
of negligence, as recommended by the proposed EU directive.
These mechanisms address the problem of incurring indefinite liability over time, but do not address the potentially enormous near-term
financial risks posed by a full-scale commercial CCS development. To
address this concern, financial liability must also be carefully managed.
The Price-Anderson Act was enacted to encourage private development of nuclear power at a time when the liabilities for managing nuclear facilities were prohibitive and unknown. That framework has
served the nuclear power industry well. As of 2008, 104 nuclear facilities

269. The Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2008, S. 3036, 110th Cong.,
§ 8004(a) (2008) (requiring EPA to study the feasibility of “potential Federal assumption of
liability with respect to” CCS).
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are licensed to operate in the United States.270 Since the Act’s inception in
1957, all liability claims have been covered by each facility’s individual
liability insurance coverage,271 and no claim has had to draw from the
pooled-industry fund. Consequently, the third tier that caps industry liability—granting federal indemnity—has also never been required.272
Given the success of the Price-Anderson model—nuclear facilities
were built and adequate financial and legal liability has been maintained
throughout the operation of each nuclear facility—an analogous liability
framework could similarly be employed to encourage CCS development.
Each operator would be individually financially responsible for an initial
tier of liability, capped at the maximum commercially insurable amount.
Each operator would also then be responsible for deferred premium contributions to an industry-funded risk pool in the event an occurrence exceeds the operator’s first tier of liability. Similar to the Price-Anderson
Act, CCS operators would have to demonstrate through one of several
alternative means that they have the financial capacity to pay the premium contribution amount. Beyond this second tier of liability, the federal government would then indemnify the industry against all
additional claims in excess of the combined value of the first two tiers of
financial liability. To protect the public sector (i.e., the taxpayer) against
indefinite financial liability, Congress could simply cap federal financial
liability on a per-project or annual basis.
A tiered approach maintains primary responsibility on the operator, so the requisite incentives for performance remain, but the whole
industry’s financial resources are brought to bear for larger and more
dynamic impacts than one entity could mitigate. This strategy also encourages the industry to self-regulate and to apply peer pressure within
the industry group, encouraging higher performance to avoid industrywide responsibility for larger occurrences. Further, the immediate burden on the industry is not so great because the pooled-risk funding requirement, as for the Price-Anderson Act, is retroactive and only
activated at the time of a triggering occurrence (i.e., when the occurrence
costs exceed the first tier of liability). So, while demonstration of financial capacity is still necessary, the second-tier costs need not be incurred
until an event triggers the risk-pool’s funding. Only after the first two
tiers of financial liability are exceeded would federal indemnity be engaged. For a nascent industry with many unknowns when operating at

270. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Map of the United States Showing Locations
of Operating Nuclear Power Reactors, http://www.nrc.gov/info-finder/reactor (last visited Mar. 29, 2009).
271. APPROACHES TO GEOLOGIC SEQUESTRATION, supra note 161, at 14.
272. Id.
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full scale, a three-tiered liability approach employed during operations
and injection—by far the riskiest period for CCS development273—provides optimal assurance that adequate financial resources and the necessary liability caps are in place to encourage responsible development.
Determining the proper financial responsibilities at each tier will
require some detailed economic investigations and analyses of the costs,
potential impacts, and availability of insurance coverage. Similarly, studies on how these costs would in turn affect a project’s financial viability
for a wide range of CCS projects and environments would need to be
conducted. Such investigations should be undertaken by Congress, industry, independent research groups, and advocates during the factfinding stage of the legislative process.
While a Price-Anderson analog would account for the periods of
operations, injection, and post-closure prior to transfer of liability to the
federal government, a liability framework must still be employed to constrain long-term risk and to avoid burdening the public sector with the
full costs of indefinite monitoring, verification, and remediation. Probably the most commonly recommended means of achieve this is through
an industry-funded, post-closure tax or fee, assessed on a per-volume
basis throughout the life of the CCS project while it remains the responsibility of the operator. Funds for each CCS project would remain tied to
that project and would be used only for monitoring, verification, and
remediation for the period following transfer to the federal government.
D. Statutorily Defined Liabilities
One of the major drawbacks of the UIC program as a regulatory
framework for CCS is that it does not clearly define the legal liability of
operators or injectors, though it appears to impose strict liability.274 An
across-the-board imposition of strict liability for CCS might make more
sense if CO2 were a hazardous material and if the technology were truly
untested. The oil and gas industry, however, has developed some expertise in CO2 over decades of injection and, for nearly as long, has been
injecting large volumes of truly hazardous substances, such as acid gas,
without significant or widespread problems. Nonetheless, the primary
unknowns regarding CCS remain its viability and effectiveness at scale.
Therefore, selective imposition of higher standards of liability to protect
critical resources, such as underground sources of drinking water and
273. See CÉDRIC PHILIBERT ET AL., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. AND INTERNAENERGY AGENCY, CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE IN THE CDM 5 (2007) (“The risk of
CO2 leaks is higher during and shortly after the injection phase, when the gas pressure is
high.”), available at http://www.iea.org/papers/2007/CCS_in_CDM.pdf.
274. NEW MEXICO CCS, supra note 66, at 53.
TIONAL
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perhaps oil and gas reserves, supports a policy that is protective of critical natural resources and imposes a high level of liability where it belongs. However, the imposition of a high level of liability should be
targeted and selective.
In this approach, strict liability should be imposed in cases of extraordinary circumstances, such as when underground sources of drinking water are contaminated, or when there is a catastrophic release of
CO2 to the surface or to an overlying geologic formation. Extraordinary
circumstances can be statutorily defined through a non-exhaustive list of
occurrences. The value of this approach is that it constrains an operator’s
liability to only those events which have been identified as having potentially the most significant negative impacts, while assuring the public
that these critical resources are protected by a high standard.
Similarly, operators should be responsible for total response costs
and mitigation if operators of a CCS site are found to be negligent or to
have violated a standard or regulation during the operations and postclosure phases—even if that finding comes after transfer of liability to
the federal government. Furthermore, if initial pilot and demonstration
projects yield data suggesting that there are greater risks for certain occurrences than anticipated, additional liability can be imposed on operators for those particular occurrences.
Because of the unique characteristics and environmental impacts
of CCS and CO2, it is possible that certain occurrences within a CCS project’s area of review can be presumed to be a consequence of CCS (such
as subsidence, increased seismicity, or vegetation die off) depending on
the geological setting. In general, these impacts may not rise to the level
of requiring the imposition of strict liability, which might arguably impose too great a burden, but they still elicit heightened public policy concerns because of their potential seriousness. Presumptions that particular
effects result from CCS acquire greater validity with increased knowledge of the project area’s history, its geology and subsurface structures
and strata, as well as with monitoring over time. Strict liability, however,
might be too great a burden for such impacts because the balance between the probability of the cause and the importance of the impacted
natural resource or property is too narrow. In the case of impacts to subsurface drinking water sources or catastrophic releases of CO2, the importance of the natural resource is substantial so the policy goal of
protecting it and holding responsible parties accountable sufficiently tips
the scale to justify imposition of strict liability. For impacts that are arguably presumptively CCS related, but for which the balance between
the relative certainty of the cause and the importance of the impacted
natural resource is closely weighted, a less onerous liability option that is
still highly protective is alternative liability.
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As discussed above, alternative liability requires the petitioner or
movant to establish some nominal level of proof of impact or damage
(such as demonstrating that increased seismicity has damaged building
foundations) which would then shift the burden to the operator, who
must prove that CCS was not the cause. Proving a negative is often a
formidable challenge and one that operators may choose to forgo, but
rebuttable presumptions are far less burdensome than strict liability.
One benefit of employing alternative liability is that operators will
have substantial incentive to collect a broad range of baseline data to
fully characterize the project area and to take measures prior to injection
that head off potential future liability problems. As discussed above, alternative liability is protective of the environment and natural resources
because it shifts the burden of proof to the operator and because establishing a negative, even by a mere preponderance of the evidence, can be
difficult. By shifting the burden to the operator, alternative liability puts
the burden where it justly belongs, with the entities that have the most
information and knowledge regarding their impacts and the injection of
CO2. Further, it reduces the likelihood that an operator could avoid liability when harmed parties are unable to muster evidence to establish
cause, despite a significant and obvious harm that is more likely than not
due to the operator’s activities.
It is possible under alternative liability that some operators will be
held accountable for “false positives” because they are unable to meet the
standard of proof required to be held blameless. To reduce this possibility, the applicable standard for operators to meet, once the burden has
shifted to them, could be a preponderance of the evidence. This would
serve the dual policy goal of placing the burden with the party holding
the bulk of the information on the alleged impacts, but would also avoid
making liability for such harms unavoidable. Imposing a reasonable
standard of proof could be especially important given the complexity of
subsurface geologic structures and the numerous causes of harm that operators cannot control.
Finally, while alternative liability at common law has been especially useful when there are numerous potential responsible parties, it
could just as easily achieve the same policy goals if there is but one potential responsible party. In the CCS industry, it is much more likely that
there will be one primary operator per injection project, which is dissimilar to the hazardous waste industry or other environmental fields for
which multiple parties may have contributed to harm. In CCS, there may
be numerous emissions sources and numerous transporters, but there
will likely be only one operator bearing sole responsibility for the content of the injected CO2 stream and its subsurface and surface effects.
This would make application of alternative liability to CCS somewhat
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unique, but it would still accomplish the primary goal of shifting the
burden of proof to the party with the critical information on in order to
avoiding injustice. For these reasons, alternative liability should be employed for a specified set of injuries or occurrences that can be identified
as uniquely related to CCS but that are not so significant that they justify
strict liability.
In a related matter and for the reasons discussed above, joint and
several liability is ill-suited and unnecessary as applied to CCS. Congress
imposed joint and several liability in CERCLA, for example, as a means
to ensure accountability and responsibility at sites where multiple parties
over many years might have some culpability. The liability standard was
also imposed as an incentive for potentially responsible parties—the entities with all the critical information to determine responsibility—to
reach extra-judicial settlement. Joint and several liability might make
sense as a highly protective standard for sites with complex transactional
histories and numerous parties, but nearly all of the policy justifications
can be achieved through selective imposition of alternative liability.
This approach has the additional benefit of constraining liability
to ensure CCS is not discouraged. CERCLA imposes joint and several
liability across the board indiscriminately. That standard is probably unnecessary and even damaging in the case of CCS for which a tiered liability approach—ranging from strict liability for a few significant impacts,
to alternative liability for less significant harms, and to a straight negligence standard for everything else—provides a more controlled approach to managing and constraining liability, while still providing
highly protective standards for critical resources and the most likely
impacts.
VII. CONCLUSION
Average global temperatures are rising and, regardless of the
emissions reductions society achieves in the immediate future, temperatures will continue to rise. Only if society manages significant reductions,
on the order of 85 percent of current emissions levels, can atmospheric
concentrations of greenhouse gases be stabilized to around a doubling of
pre-industrial levels. That effort will help limit warming to roughly
2°C—still a significant global temperature increase with significant ecological and economic impacts.
To maintain that stability, fossil fuels must be jettisoned as society’s primary energy source. But to achieve those emissions cuts without
provoking a vast and precipitous disruption of social and economic networks, burning of fossil fuels must be phased out over time—especially
since the abundance, accessibility, relative affordability, and reliability of
coal, can help meet the projected growth in energy demand. Addition-
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ally, no alternative energy source, or combination of sources, stand at the
ready for full, commercial-scale deployment to replace fossil fuels.
Therefore, to achieve the necessary emissions cuts, technologies must be
employed that allow for continued reliance on fossil fuels but that can
achieve significant reductions in CO2 emissions.
The benefits of CCS can be substantial and should be seriously
considered as a requirement for any permitted fossil-fuel electricity generating plant, but especially for proposed coal-fired plants. For example,
if all current coal-burning power plants were replaced by Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle plants with CCS, “total emissions of CO2
would decline by 60 percent to about 0.9 Gt per year. If, in addition, all
carbon emissions from natural gas plants were also captured and sequestered, overall emissions would drop further, to 0.4 Gt per year or 80 percent below current levels.”275
Because CCS is highly analogous to technologies and methods
long-employed in the oil fields for EOR, it is a ready technology that can
theoretically achieve required emissions reductions immediately and for
the foreseeable future. For CCS to be realized on a commercial scale of
sufficient magnitude, however, a statutory and regulatory framework
must be developed that is protective of natural resources, the environment, and human health; yet, the framework must also manage CCS operator liability. Without some judicious limitations on operator liability,
private enterprise and investment will not support a timely implementation of this critical technology. To achieve the right balance of accountability and environmental protection necessary to garner public support
for an industrial undertaking of such an enormous scale, a wholly
unique statutory and regulatory paradigm ought to be developed. Such a
framework would apply tiered approaches to both legal and financial
liabilities, holding operators most accountable when critical natural resources are at risk or jeopardized.
This approach is at odds with some analyses that perceive the current regulatory paradigm as sufficient.276 Such arguments derive from a
concern that early over-regulation can have the unintended consequence
of stifling CCS development by erecting barriers to its natural development.277 While it is undoubtedly important to tread carefully to avoid
over-regulating an industry that has had no time to evolve on its own,

275. MORGAN ET AL., supra note 6, at 59 (noting that an 80 percent reduction is “roughly
the magnitude of the electric sector’s share of the long-term emissions reduction that scientists estimate will be required to stabilize CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere at twice
pre-industrial levels”).
276. See, e.g., Marston & Moore, supra note 35, at 421.
277. Id. at 490.
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none of the foregoing recommendations are significantly divergent from
the regulations that would otherwise apply. Rather, these recommendations seek to streamline CCS regulation within a comprehensive and
fully integrated carbon management scheme. This comprehensive CCS
regulation scheme can achieve the foundational policy goals by clarifying applicable environmental and regulatory requirements while also exempting CCS from key federal environmental provisions. The
fundamental benefit of comprehensive CCS regulation is that the above
recommendations impose liability more selectively, which incentivizes
and promotes CCS development.
Of course, the liability scheme should be reviewed frequently at
the outset of CCS deployment, perhaps as often as every year for the first
decade or so but then less frequently as the technology becomes more
robust. If CCS is to succeed, it must be publicly acceptable, which means
the public benefits must outweigh the costs, the environmental risks
must be disclosed, and the process needs to be transparent and comprehensible. Perhaps most importantly, however, the injectors and operators
of CCS facilities must be held accountable.278 The foregoing recommendations, though skeletal in their presentation, provide such a framework
with the proper balance of accountability and incentive.

278. See Wong-Parodi et al., supra note 43, at 5 (“[P]ositive perceptions of geologic sequestration by the public [are] important to its success, because as we have seen, (negative
perceptions) can be enough to kill a technology.”) (internal quotes omitted).
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